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BEING PROPORTIONAL ABOUT 
PROPORTIONALITY 
THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW. By David M. Beatty. 1 
New York: Oxford University Press. 2004. Pp. 193 + xvii. 
$80.00 
Vicki C. J ackson2 
"Proportionality" analysis is becoming a term of art in con-
stitutional law. If you have not heard of it, that is because the 
concept has received far more elaboration and evaluation out-
side of the United States. One of the leading proponents of pro-
portionality analysis in constitutional law is the Canadian legal 
scholar, David M. Beatty. For the last decade, Beatty has pur-
sued a vision of comparative constitutional study as revealing 
"timeless" or "universal" ideals of proportionality and rational-
ity in constitutional adjudication around the world.3 In his latest 
book, The Ultimate Rule of Law, he advances the argument that 
constitutional courts around the world are, and should be, turn-
ing away from a focus on "interpretation" and instead concen-
I. J. Robert, S. Prichard, and Ann E. Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, Uni-
versity of Toronto. 
2. Professor of Law, Georgetown University. With thanks to Jason Cohen, Amber 
Dolman, James Caputo, and Soraya Kelly for research assistance and, for helpful com-
ments and conversations, to Bob Taylor, Mark Tushnet, John Mikhail, Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Dan Tarullo, Mike Seidman, Gerry Spann, Kathy Zeiler, Richard Diamond, 
Emma Jordan, John Echeverria, Julie Cohen, John Jackson, Tim Westmoreland, David 
Beatty, and Judith Resnik. My special thanks to Professor Beatty for his generosity in 
reviewing an earlier draft and for his many contributions to comparative constitutional 
understanding. Special thanks are due to Marylin Raisch and Mabel Shaw, international 
reference librarians at Georgetown. This review was written in 2004. 
3. See, e.g., DAVID M. BEATfY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 10~5 (1995) [hereinafter BEATfY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; cf. Donald P. 
Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & 
PROC. 685 (1976) (comparative constitutional study as search for "principles of justice 
and political obligation that transcend the culture bound opinions and conventions of a 
particular political community"). In earlier work, Beatty characterized constitutional in-
terpretation as having two stages-interpretation and justification-and as employing 
two dominant modes of analysis-rationality (or necessity) and proportionality (or con-
sistency). See BEATfY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra, at 107; see also David M. Beatty, 
Review Essays: Law and Politics, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 131, 136-40 (1996). 
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trate on applying the principle of proportionality to measure the 
constitutionality of challenged government actions. 
As Beatty shows, in Canada, Germany, the European Court 
of Human Rights, India, Ireland, South Africa, and on occasion 
even in the United States, courts or tribunals invoke the basic 
concept of proportionality not only to review the propriety of 
sanctions, but also to measure the legality of a wide range of 
government conduct through some form of means-ends analyses. 
In a number of countries, proportionality analysis is treated as a 
general principle of public law, applicable not only to constitu-
tional law, but also to administrative and even to international 
law questions.4 Although means-end analyses are found in a 
wide swathe of constitutional doctrine in many tribunals, a dis-
tinguishing feature of proportionality analysis is its eschewal of 
doctrinal sub-categories, its commitment to returning to founda-
tional questions of constitutional purpose in structuring analyses 
of challenges to government action, and its requirement that the 
government come forward with justifications for statutes that in-
fringe on protected rights. 5 
Canada has played a particularly influential role in the 
transnational development of proportionality testing in constitu-
tional law. In Canada, the 1982 Charter of Rights introduced a 
number of innovations, including a "salvage" clause, into consti-
tutional analysis. Canadian constitutional analysis proceeds in 
two stages. First, the court considers whether there has been an 
infringement of a right specified in the Charter, such as rights of 
freedom of expression, freedom of religion, or equality. If an in-
fringement is found, and if the government action has been au-
thorized by law, the Court then decides whether the challenged 
act can be "salvaged" or saved through analysis under Section 1 
of the Charter. Section 1 provides that: "The Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set 
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic soci-
4. See, e.g., Beit Sourik Viii. Council v. Gov't of Israel, (2004]43 ILM 1099 (S.Ct. 
lsr.) (President A. Barak) (treating proportionality as a principle of both domestic and 
international public law, supporting judicial review of military operations to prevent dis-
proportionate harm to civilian populations). 
5. See R. v. Oakes, (1986]1 S.C.R. 103, 136 (S. Ct. Canada) ("Inclusion of these 
words ('free and democratic society'] as the final standard of justification for limits on 
rights and freedoms refers the Court to the very purpose for which the Chaner wa~ origi-
nally entrenched in the Constitution: Canadian society is to be free and democratic. The 
Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic so-
ciety .... "). 
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ety." Under R. v. Oakes,6 statutes that are found to violate Char-
ter rights may nonetheless be upheld under Section 1 if (1) their 
purpose is one consistent with a "free and democratic society" 
and "of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitu-
tionally protected right or freedom," and (2) the statutory limits 
"are reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democ-
ratic society," a standard designed to "ensure[] that the legisla-
tive means are proportional to ,the legislative ends." 7 
The means-ends proportionality analysis has been further 
elaborated in Canadian caselaw, caselaw that is widely cited by 
constitutional courts around the world. In Canada: 
There are ... three important components of a proportional-
ity test. First, the measures adopted must be carefully de-
signed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be 
arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In 
short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Sec-
ond, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective 
in this first sense, should impair "as little as possible" the right 
or freedom in question .... Third, there must be a propor-
tionality between the effects of the measures which are re-
sponsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the 
objective which has been identified as of "sufficient impor-
tance".8 
6. [1986]1 S.C.R. 103. 
7. R. v. Morgentaler, (1988] S.C.R. 30, 73 (paraphrasing Oakes and quoting R. v. 
Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985]1 S.C.R. 285, 352); see id. (referring to Section 1 as a "sal-
vage" clause). The Oakes test and Canada's Section 1 jurisprudence has influenced con-
stitution drafters and/or courts in South Africa, Hong Kong, India, Namibia, New Zea-
land and the U.K.. See Jeremy Sarkin, The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the 
Drafting of South Africa's Bill of Rights and Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions, 1 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 176, 186-87 (1998); Richard Cullen, Media Freedom in Chinese Hong 
Kong, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 383,400 (1998); Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001]4 LRI 
1049, 'I 34 (2000), (2001) 2 S.C.C. 386 (India); Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, 1995 
SACLR LEXIS 273, *20-*24, (1995) 11 BCLR 1540 (S.Ct. Namibia); R. (on the applica-
tion of Royden) v. Borough of Wirral, 2002 WL 31523290, '183 (QBD (Admin. Ct.)), 
(2002] EWHC 2484 (Admin), '183; R. (on the application of Pearson) v. Sec. of State for 
the Home Dept., 2001 WL 272951 (QBD (Admin. Ct.)), (2001] EWHC Admin 239; 
Northern Reg'l Health Auth. v. Human Rights Comm'n, [1998]2 NZLR 218 (H.C.). 
8. Oakes, (1986]1 S.C.R. at 139. The second test, of "minimal impairment," could 
have been treated like the American "least restrictive means" test. But as the Oakes 
statement of the test suggests, the rigor of the fit required may vary depending on both 
the severity of the infringement and the importance of the government objective. See id. 
("A wide range of rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the Charter, and an almost in-
finite number of factual situations may arise in respect of these. Some limits on rights and 
freedoms protected by the Charter will be more serious than others in terms of the nature 
of the right or freedom violated, the extent of the violation, and the degree to which the 
measures which impose the limit trench upon the integral principles of a free and democ-
ratic society."). Later caselaw softens the demands of "minimal impairment." See, e.g., R. 
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The third criterion is sometimes referred to as proportionality in 
the "strict" sense.9 Recall that in Canada, proportionality analy-
sis under Section 1 only happens after the Court has found an in-
fringement of a Charter-protected constitutional right; if there is 
no such infringement, the issue under Section 1 does not arise. 10 
As the Oakes opinion explains this third criterion of proportion-
ality in the strict sense, it contemplates a highly contextualized 
analysis of the deleterious effects measured against the impor-
tance of the government's purpose" and, in some versions, the 
likelihood of achieving that purpose through the chosen means. 
Although the Oakes test is widely referred to, there are 
other versions of proportionality in use in constitutional courts 
around the world. Sometimes, the last part of the proportionality 
test is articulated more directly in terms of costs and benefits, 
e.g., "the act must be proportionate strictly speaking (verhalt-
nismassig), which means that its costs must remain less than the 
benefits secured by its ends."12 There are significant differences 
v. Keegstra, (1990)3 S.C.R. 697, 784-85 (suggesting that the "minimal impairment" test 
does not necessarily require a non-penal approach to hate speech). 
9. See Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence and Proportionality for Congressional En-
forcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution?, 78 IND. L.J. 567, 582 (2003). 
This idea is also referred to as "proportionality in the narrow sense". See, e.g., Baruch 
Bracha, Constitutional Upgrading of Human Rights in Israel: The Impact of Administra-
tive Law, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 638 n.285 (2001), quoting HCJ 3477/95 Ben-Atiya v. 
Minister of Educ., Culture & Sport, [49(5) P.O. 1, 12-13) (Barak, J.) (means are im-
proper "if the injury to the individual is disproportionate to the benefit which it achieves 
in implementing the purpose ... [a) test of the proportional means (or the proportional-
ity in the 'narrow sense')"). 
10. As might be predicted, however, the Canadian Court has tended towards broad 
reading of the scope of protected rights, particularly of freedom of expression, under the 
Charter, leading to a number of cases in which the question is whether a statute, found to 
infringe on a protected right, nonetheless is constitutional because it meets the criteria of 
Section 1. 
II. From Oakes, [1986)1 S.C.R. at 140: 
Even if an objective is of sufficient importance, and the first two elements of t~e 
proportionality test are satisfied, it is still possible that, because of the seventy 
of the deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups, the measure 
will not be justified by the purposes it is intended to serve. The more severe the 
deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be if the 
measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. 
12. Zoller, supra note 9, at 582. The quoted material is embedded in a longer de-
scription of proportionality in Germany as a test of the validity of government 3:c~ion: 
The principle of proportionality is considered to be satisfied if three conditions 
are met: (1) the act must be appropriate ... , which implies a choice of means 
tailored to the achievement of the ends (as the idiomatic expression goes: "one 
has to cut the coat according to the cloth"); (2) the act must be necessary ... , 
which would not be the case if the ends could be achieved with less restrictive or 
burdensome means; and (3) the act must be proportionate strictly speaking . : ., 
which means that its costs must remain less than the benefits secured by Its 
ends. 
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in these formulations-judicial review that turns on an evalua-
tion of the importance of the objective measured against its in-
fringing effects on protected rights is likely to be somewhat more 
deferential than judicial review that is, in addition, based on an 
evaluation of whether the means chosen will produce propor-
tionally greater results towards the government objective than 
harm to the protected right. In the United States, the language 
of proportionality is used only in limited areas, 13 while in others, 
there are different degrees of means-end relationships (or de-
grees of "proportionality") required, depending on the impor-
tance of the right in question through categorical doctrinal in-
quiries (e.g., "rationality" review for economic classifications, 
"compelling interest" review for racial classifications). 
Beatty is primarily concerned with versions of proportional-
ity analysis which, like the Canadian or German approaches, 
consider not only rationality and availability of other alterna-
tives, but proportionality in the "strict sense" of some degree of 
fit between the harm that some endure, or the intrusions some 
suffer, in order to create a legitimate benefit for others. Beatty is 
quite persuasive as to the pervasiveness of the phenomena of 
such proportionality analysis, both the Canadian version and 
others used by the European Court of Human Rights, the Indian 
Supreme Court, the German Federal Constitutional Court, and a 
number of other influential constitutional tribunals. He provides 
examples in three major areas of constitutional law-religious 
liberty, gender and racial equality, and positive welfare rights-
to illustrate courts' concerns for the proportionality of govern-
ment actions that impose special burdens on some and, increas-
ingly, for the proportionality, or fairness, of government efforts 
to provide assistance or opportunities. 
But Beatty's ambitions are not merely descriptive. First, in 
the course of description Beatty develops what one might call a 
"best practices" approach to proportionality analysis. For Beatty, 
/d. 
13. In evaluating the constitutionality of punishment the test of "gross dispropor-
tionality" is concerned only with very substantial disparities between burdens imposed 
and legitimate objectives advanced. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) 
("'The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and 
sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to 
the crime."' (citation omitted)). In addition, proportionality plays a role in determining 
the scope of congressional power to enact legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), in determining the 
c'?nstitutionality of regulatory conditions for property development, see Dolan v. City of 
T1gard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994), and in limiting punitive damages awarded in civil cases. 
See BMW of N. America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,581 (1996). 
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the best version of proportionality analysis is one that relies on 
pragmatic, empirically contextualized reasoning. It seeks to view 
legal issues through the perspectives of those most benefitted 
and most burdened by challenged action, while generally accept-
ing a wide range of legitimate government ends. These are the 
tools of proportionality analysis, "properly enforced" (p. 166). 
Adherence to these practices, he argues, means that proportion-
ality analysis meets criteria for neutrality and objectivity in con-
stitutional adjudication. 
Second, Beatty argues that such proportionality analysis, 
rather than interpretation of constitutional texts, should be seen 
as the fundamental tool of normatively responsible judicial re-
view in self-governing democratic polities.1 Much of the hard 
work of constitutional adjudication, he argues, turns on the ques-
tion of government justification of its actions, an inquiry best 
guided by the norms of proportionality analysis. Moreover, pro-
portionality analysis would yield a more determinate and impar-
tial form of constitutionalism than a focus on interpretation of 
constitutional provisions under any of the leading schools of in-
terpretation. Rather than focusing on interpreting a constitution 
within its historic traditions, or considering questions of institu-
tional role or deference, constitutional judges should carefully 
scrutinize the facts to determine whether, in light of the govern-
mental purposes intended to be served, the challenged act or ac-
tion appropriately accommodates the interests of those most af-
fected or concerned. In so arguing, Beatty dispenses not only 
with "interpretation" but (at times) with "rights" (p. 171).15 Jus-
14. The nonnative claim for proportionality is set up in the first chapter and con-
tinues throughout the book. Proportionality, Beatty says, is the best theory for constitu-
tional interpretation that "reconcile[s] the practice of judicial review with the sovereignty 
of people to govern themselves," through which "courts do not resolve conflict and judge 
the way those in government exercise the powers of the state on the basis of their own 
personal opinions of what is right and wrong [but rather based on] a theory ... that tells 
Uudges] how they can distinguish laws that are a legitimate expression of the coercive 
powers of the state from those that are not without being influenced by their own biases 
and personal points of view" (p. 5). 
15. Beatty writes (at p. 171, emphasis added): 
{W]hen judges rely on the principle of proportionality to structure their thinking 
the concept of rights disappears. Proportionality transforms the meaning of 
rights from assertions of eternal truths into what human rights advocate Mi-
chael Ignatieff has called 'a discourse ~or the adjudication. of conflic~.' In law, 
they are just 'common ... reference pomts ... that <:'ln ass1st part1~s m con.fl1ct 
to deliberate together.' When rights are factored mto an analys1s orgaruzed 
around the principle of proportionality they have no special force as trumps. 
They are really just rhetorical flourish." 
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tification of challenged government action becomes the focus of 
analysis. 16 
Readers already inclined to functional or consequentialist 
interpretation, and those who believe that universal human 
rights should be implemented through the interpretation of na-
tional constitutions, will find much of appeal. Readers new to the 
field may benefit particularly from Professor Beatty's elegant 
and concise summaries of debates over constitutional interpreta-
tion in Chapter I and over positive and negative constitutional 
rights in Chapter IV. But aspects of Beatty's normative argu-
ments for proportionality raise more complex problems than he 
allows. For those who, like myself, agree that proportionality is 
an important tool in constitutional interpretation, Beatty's cer-
tainty that it is the only and best tool can at times be frustrating, 
for it prevents him from fully meeting objections to proportion-
ality analysis. For reasons developed below, Beatty's positive de-
scriptions of the centrality of proportionality to constitutional 
analysis require significant qualification, and his normative 
claims for the greater determinacy and objectivity of proportion-
ality analysis are less than fully persuasive. 
Better justifications for reliance on proportionality as a 
principle of constitutional analysis, I argue below, include: (1) its 
transparency in framing concerns of fairness likely to be relevant 
in a significant swathe of constitutional decisionmaking; (2) its 
capacity for encouraging participatory deliberation through 
structured inquiries into the effects of and justification for chal-
lenged action; and (3) its flexibility as a tool for protecting rights 
and maintaining constitutional law as an effective legal con-
straint on government over time. But proportionality also has a 
darker side-both in what it may permit governments to do and 
what it may permit courts to prohibit or require of governments. 
Both formal categorical rules and institutionalism's concern for 
the allocation of responsibilities among courts and political or-
gans have more to offer on questions of interpretive methodolo-
gies than this book acknowledges. Proportionality analysis, 
16. See also Matthew Adler, Rights against Rules: The Moral Structure of American 
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1998) (arguing that we have rights against rules, 
not rights to engage in conduct or be left alone, with a focus on the moral justification for 
the rules); see also Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Ex-
pressive Harms and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 725, 727-32 (1998). For a chal-
lenge to Adler's description, see Richard Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and 
Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000). For Adler's reply, see Matthew 
Adler, Rights, Rules and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to Pro-
fessor Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371 (2000). 
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moreover, often co-exists with attention to historically specific 
aspects of national constitutions and cannot serve as the exclu-
sive tool of national constitutional interpretation without ignor-
ing the role of national constitutions as instruments of national 
self -expression. 
Part I below discusses Beatty's principal claims for the 
dominance and normative superiority of proportionality analy-
sis. It suggests that his positive claims must be qualified by the 
continued attention to specific constitutional text found in some 
of the very decisions Beatty relies on and that his normative 
claims for the superior impartiality and determinacy of propor-
tionality analysis are unconvincing. Part II elaborates difficulties 
in the normative argument reflected in tensions between propor-
tionality's neutrality and its value commitments to equality. Part 
Ill takes up the positive normative case for proportionality as I 
see it, advancing alternative justifications for its use as one 
method of constitutional interpretation. Part IV considers pro-
portionality's complexity, its "dark side," and its applicability in 
the United States. In closing, I note tensions between Beatty's 
universalism and the demands of democratic self-government in 
particular national polities and urge a more proportionate use of 
proportionality in response. 
I. 
Proportionality, Beatty argues, is the "only conceptual ap-
paratus judges have ... to harmonize the autonomy of each per-
son with the general will of the community ... " (p. 116).17 What-
ever the claim, the question should be whether a law passes a 
rigorous evaluation of its ends, its means and its effects against a 
principle of proportionality that connects all three (p. 116). In 
earlier work, Beatty suggests that the "two basic principles, jus-
tice and equality," are what the method of constitutional law is 
about.18 Proportionality seems to embrace both (p. 158).19 
17. See also p. 176 ("Proportionality has priority over all of its rivals because it is 
able to reconcile both democracy and rights in a way that optimizes each. Proportionality 
alone has the capacity to ensure constitutions are the best they can possibly be."). 
18. BEATfY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 159. 
19. Beatty claims that once the principle of proportionality is properly understood, 
"liberty, equality and fraternity all mean the same thing. Ensuring everyone who is au-
thorized to exercise the powers of the state always acts moderately and with respect for 
others is the one and only function judges are authorized and competent to perform" (p. 
158). Beatty also equates proportionality with "toleration" (pp. 59-6>), and "mutual re-
spect" (p. 163). And in his concluding chapter, Beatty writes that judges aroun~ the 
world have "constructed a working model of judicial review that relies, almost entirely, 
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The method of proportionality, Beatty says, "requires 
judges to assess the legitimacy of whatever law or regulation or 
ruling is before them from the perspective of those who reap its 
greatest benefits and those who stand to lose the most." (p. 160). 
In so doing, courts are not to rely on their personal views, but 
rather on the evaluation of those who are parties to the litiga-
tion/0 measured by objective indicia that permit impartial 
evaluations of whether the parties' claims should be accepted?1 
These objective indicia are, for challengers, factors that go to 
how important to their "larger life stories" the complained of 
acts are, as compared with their benefits in the lives of others (p. 
73)/2 and for governmental justifications, objective facts that go 
to the rigor with which the particular means chosen has been en-
forced, or are being applied by other polities committed to simi-
lar goals.23 
Existing schools of interpretation, he argues, fail to meet 
standards of determinacy, neutrality, and judicial competency. 
Contract theory (including textualism and originalism) yields 
multiple understandings of original intention or meaning (p. 10), 
and is not scrupulously adhered to by its proponents in hard 
cases (p. 14). Process theory, he argues, is "radically indetermi-
nate" (p. 17) absent a neutral rule to distinguish process failure 
on the principle of proportionality to tell them when the elected representatives of the 
people and their officials are acting properly and when they are not" (pp. 15~0). Pro-
portionality, here, then, stands for many virtues of governance: liberty, equality, frater-
nity, moderation, tolerance, and propriety. But cf Lorraine Weinrib, Constitutional Con-
ceptions and Constitutional Comparativism, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (Vicki Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002) (proportionality as a 
method of protecting equal human dignity). 
20. Thus, he writes: "Rather than acting as an expositor of text, or a philosopher 
king, the job of the judge is critically to evaluate all the evidence that is brought to his or 
her attention in order to get the most accurate assessment of what the parties really 
think" (p. 116). 
21. See, e.g., p. 187 ("By directing judges to the evidence that best describes the par-
ties' own evaluations of the situation, proportionality encourages judges who find them-
selves leaning to one side of a case to listen more carefully to the other. Proportionality 
permits pragmatic judges to attain a level of objectivity and impartiality beyond anything 
they have achieved so far."). 
22. Thus, for example, he commends the German Constitutional Court for uphold-
ing prayer in public schools, provided that children who do not wish to pray can opt out. 
Denying the majority this right of public worship would be disproportionate to the inter-
ests of the few children who do not wish to pray (pp. 46-48, 52, 54). 
23. Thus, for example, he condemns the European Court of Human Rights for fail-
ing to uphold claims by parents that they have a right to withhold their children from sex 
education in the public schools; the fact that private schools in the country were not re-
quired by law to teach the same objectionable (to-the-parents-material) suggested that 
the governmental interest in such instruction was not strong enough to override the par-
ents' objection to sex education in the public school (pp. 66-67). 
812 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:803 
from ordinary democratic politics.24 The very different views of, 
on the one hand, Sunstein and Monahan, and, on the other hand, 
Habermas, concerning courts' enforcement of positive rights 
shows the failure of process theory to meet standards of deter-
minacy and neutrality: "The fact that a process model of judicial 
review can support two completely contradictory conclusions, on 
issues as important as these, undercuts any claim of neutrality 
that may be made on its behalf" (p. 24 ). As for moral reasoning 
(like that proposed by Dworkin), Beatty notes that it takes for 
itself not "neutrality" but "integrity" as the standard. But in so 
doing, he argues, it invites judges to engage in forms of reason-
ing for which they are not trained and in which a large area of 
indeterminacy is present: "Whether fit or value, precedent or 
philosophy, is to be given priority in any case remains wholly 
within the discretion of each judge"(p. 30).25 This approach al-
lows too much discretion for judges-allowing them to decide on 
the permissibility of abortion or euthanasia "constitutes a mas-
sive derogation from the authority of each person and the sover-
eignty of the people as a whole to decide the great questions of 
life and death for themselves"(p. 33). Moreover, the method of 
moral reasoning fails to fit judges' "self-understanding of their 
craft" (p. 32). Finding these schools of interpretation inadequate, 
Beatty proposes to "tr[y] to work out a theory of constitutional 
review as common lawyers," based on what constitutional court 
judges are actually doing (p. 34). 
Beatty thus invites readers to judge his interpretive the-
ory-of proportionality as the necessary and sufficient tool of 
constitutional adjudication-by the standards of neutrality, de-
terminacy and "fit" with existing interpretive practices. "Making 
proportionality the critical test ... separates the powers of the 
judiciary and the elected branches of government in a way that 
provides a solution to the paradox" of judicial review and de-
mocracy. It is, in Professor Wechsler's terms, a '"neutral princi-
ple,"' meeting Dworkin's criteria of "fit" and "value" (pp. 160-
61). Embracing some of Judge Bork's elaboration of the idea of 
neutral principles, Beatty suggests that proportionality can be 
applied even-handedly, and is "neutrally derived" and "neutrally 
24. Beatty is quoting Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) (criticizing JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)). 
25. Beatty also notes, however, that "[f]it and value may be necessary conditions 
for an adequate theory of judicial review," but, he says, "without an overarching princi-
ple that dictates how they should be reconciled they are plainly not enough" (p. 30). 
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defined" (p. 161). The fact that every major court with power to 
engage in judicial review has employed proportionality analysis 
"attests to the integrity of its derivation" (p. 162). Proportional-
ity is a "universal criterion of constitutionality," constitutive of 
the structure of a constitution that subordinates government to 
the rule of law (pp . 162-63). 
Taking up Beatty's implicit invitation to evaluate theories 
against criteria of existing practice, neutrality and determinacy, 
however, suggests that proportionality's significance and neutral-
ity may be much more in the eyes of the beholder than Beatty 
allows. 
Existing Practice: Beatty argues, first, that proportionality is 
neutrally derived because it is found in the reasoning of many 
courts. Beatty is surely correct to argue that concern for propor-
tionality and rationality are pervasive themes in constitutional 
review, suggesting that they are a necessary part of the interpre-
tive tool box for modern constitutional courts, at least under 
some conditions. For evidence of the growth of proportionality 
analysis in constitutional courts analysis around the world, one 
could look to the recent decision of the Israeli High Court hold-
ing that both Israeli and international public law require gov-
ernment conduct towards citizens of the West Bank to be "pro-
portional," and ordering the relocation of portions of the 
already-erected "separation fence. "26 The Court found that the 
purpose of the fence was legitimate, but that the burden its loca-
tions imposed on local farmers was disproportionate to the 
added security it would provide: Israel would have to move the 
wall, enduring somewhat less security, in order to afford propor-
tional and just treatment to the civilians whose farming life was 
otherwise massively disrupted.27 Although few constitutional 
courts exercise powers of review over military decisions of their 
governments, many do apply the idea of proportionality in a 
wide range of cases. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how some 
means-ends testing between the classification and the purpose of 
the statute would not be used in any system that took seriously 
the idea of equality as a substantive norm?8 
26. Beit Sourik Viii. Council v. Gov't of Israel, HCJ 20561()4 (2004] 43 ILM 1099, 
1113-19 (S.Ct. Isr.). 
27. /d. at 1120-22. 
28. For differing perspectives on the role of proportionality analysis in equality 
cases m Germany, compare Susanne Baer, Constitutional Equality: The Jurisprudence of 
the German Constitutional Court, 5 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 249, 261-62 (1999) (describing 
heightened standard of review for equality claims, requiring that differences in treatment 
not merely be not irrational but justified, as form of "proportionality" review) with Alex-
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Beatty seeks to bolster the normative force of practice by 
minimizing courts' reliance on constitutional text and precedent. 
His observation that constitutional text is rarely "the critical or 
determining factor" in cases involving positive rights finds much 
confirmation in decided cases (p. 137). Indeed, the resemblance 
between the U.S. decision in Dandrige v. Williams29 and the 
Japanese constitutional decision in Asahi v Japan30 is notewor-
thy. Both reject claims that welfare allowances are too small for 
the measure they are supposed to cover, even though the Japa-
nese constitution has a seemingl)' absolute constitutional right to 
support and the U.S. constitution does not.31 
But Beatty appears to understate the role of constitutional 
text in some of the other cases discussed.32 For example, he im-
plies that the Indian Supreme Court creates positive rights with-
out specific constitutional text, drawing from the constitutional 
right to "life" the positive right to state support for a liveli-
hood. 33 But the Indian case on which he relies involved a more 
complicated question of the effect of nonjusticable constitutional 
provisions in determining the contours of justiciable individual 
rights.34 Notwithstanding their purportedly nonjusticiable status, 
ander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second Ger-
manization of American Equal Protection Revew, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 284 (1998) (argu-
ing that apparent significance of proportionality review in German equality cases is over-
stated). 
29. 397 u.s. 471 (1970) 
30. 21 Minshii 5 (Sup. Q. Japan, 1967), in THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF 
JAPAN: SELECI'ED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70 (Hiroshi ltoh & Lawrence 
Ward Beer eds. & trans., 1978). 
31. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1440-47 (1999). 
32. Whether these texts matter only because they are written or because they rep-
resent a sociolegal set of commitments that are only reflected in the constitution is an-
other question. 
33. Beatty introduces his discussion of this case by asserting that the fact that a con-
stitution is silent on positive rights "need never be fatal to a case" (p. 138). 
34. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp., (1986) A.I.R. (S.C.) 180, a case 
brought by "pavement dwellers" to forestall their eviction from the sidewalks, the Indian 
Supreme Court famously concluded that the right to life guaranteed by article 21 of the 
Indian Constitution includes the right to a livelihood. In so ruling, however, the Court 
referred to portions of the so-called "Directive Principles" of the Indian constitution-
principles that impose positive duties on the government but are declared nonjusticiable. 
The Court referred to articles 39(a) (which indicates that the state take steps towards 
securing a right to an adequate livelihood) and 41 (which says that the state shall make 
provision for securing the right to work), both as Directive Principles. After noting arti-
cles 39(a) and 41, the Court wrote: 
If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate 
means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude 
the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The Stare may not, by 
affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or 
work to the citizens. But, any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood 
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the Indian Supreme Court appeared to rely on directive princi-
ples concerning a right to a livelihood and read that concept into 
the justiciable "right to life" provisions. Although Beatty claims 
the case shows that constitutional silence is no barrier to the im-
plication of positive rights, perhaps all that the case stands for is 
that the silence of one provision need not be fatal, if other as-
pects of the Constitution (and culture) support a positive under-
standing of the state's obligations to the poor.35 
A striking example of Beatty's somewhat selective analysis 
is his discussion of an Indian Supreme Court decision articulat-
ing the right of all children to receive a primary school education 
up to age fourteen.36 Beatty treats the case as developing from 
proportionality principles the requirement that the children re-
ceive a primary education. It is true, as Beatty notes (p. 142), 
that the decision refers to India as having allocated a dispropor-
tionate share of what it spent on education for secondary and 
tertiary learning, rather than primary education. But it does so in 
the context of discussing Article 45 of the Constitution of India. 
That provision states: 
The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of 10 
years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free 
and compulsory education for all children until they complete 
the age of fourteen years. 
Recognizing that Article 45 was in the nonjusticiable, "di-
rective principles" portion of the Constitution, Judge Jeevan 
Reddy also noted that the ten year period referred to in Article 
45 had expired; thus, he reasoned, the state now owed a more 
definite duty. The Jeevan Reddy judgment concluded that Arti-
except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the 
deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by An. 21. 
Olga Tellis, (1986) A.I.R. at 194, '133 (emphasis added). 
35. For another example of the significance vel non of constitutional text, consider 
that both India and the United States have constitutionalized forms of affirmative action; 
the U.S. Constitution's text is silent on the subject while the Indian constitution affirma-
tively authorizes affirmative action (or 'positive discrimination') on behalf of members of 
the scheduled cast::s and tribes through reservation of seats in legislatures and posts in 
government. Yet the contours of what is permissible differ rather dramatically between 
these two countries. Compare lndra Sawhney v. Union of India, (1993) A.I.R. (S.C.) 477 
(limiting reservation of seats to no more than 49% of those available and requiring that 
the "creamy layer" of any disadvantaged group be excluded from the reservations) with 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (permitting only "individualized" consid-
eration of race, in a non-quota setting, without articulating any requirement that eco-
nomically advantaged members of minority races be excluded from such consideration). 
For discussion, see Mark Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some Cau-
tionary Notes with Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649, 655-{i2 (2004). 
36. Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) A.I.R. (S.C.) 2178. 
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cle 21 (a very general provision protecting life and liberty) em-
braced a right to education, a right which, the judgment said 
should be "construed in the light of the directive principles. "37 
Thus, his judgment read into the enforceable provisions of Arti-
cle 21, the Article 45 duty of the government to provide free 
compulsory education for all children up to age fourteen. It is a 
far cry from a court's deducing such an obligation from explicit 
(albeit nonjusticiable) constitutional text to assert that a court 
has deduced such a specific obligation from general principles of 
proportionality .38 
Likewise, in discussing differences between U.S. and Ger-
man decisions on religious liberty, Beatty gives short shrift to the 
possibility that some of the differences relate, not to the inter-
pretive method, but to differences in pre-existing political com-
mitments, embodied in part in different constitutional texts. 
Beatty is quite critical of much of the U.S. caselaw, which hear-
gues is characterized by a method that purports to be based on 
historic understandings of the U.S. text and the Court's own 
precedents.39 He implies that the Court's methodology contrib-
utes to its substantive failures, which, in his view, include a fail-
ure to allow majoritarian freedom of worship by an unduly rigid 
"separation" doctrine (as in the ban on prayer at high school 
graduation) and a failure to accommodate the practices of reli-
gious minorities through a rigid insistence on categorical rules 
and insensitive failure to require accommodations (as in the rule 
that generally applicable laws may be applied without exceptions 
for religiously motivated behavior). The German caselaw on 
school prayer, he argues, better accommodates both the right of 
37. /d. at 2231; see also id. at 2232. 
38. The issue before the Court, moreover, had nothing to do with primary educa-
tion or with children under fourteen, rather, it had to do with the admissions standards 
and fees for admission to private universities or colleges. Two of the five judges on the 
bench declined to join in the Jeevan Reddy discussion of an article 21 right to a free pub-
lic education for those under fourteen. See id. at 2186--87 (Sharma, C.J.) (for present pur-
poses "it is enough to state that there is no Fundamental Right to education for a profes-
sional degree that flows from Article 21"). For description of a constitutional amendment 
in response to this decision, see Vijayashri Sripati & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, India: 
Constitutional amendment making the right to education a Fundamental Right, 2 INT'L 1. 
CONST. L. 148 (2004). 
39. Thus, Beatty writes, the "interpretive approach has certainly not worked to the 
advantage of religiously minded people in the United States," because Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577 (1992) and Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) "allow government to act 
in ways that radically restrict the freedom of people to practice their religion," neither 
protecting minority religious adherents from the application of general laws that "gratui-
tously interfere with the practice of their religion" nor allowing "spiritually minded peo-
ple to express their beliefs publicly and collectively" (p. 50). 
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religious majorities to engage in "public collective" acts of wor-
ship, through prayer in the public schools (so long as children 
who do not wish to pray are not forced to pray), while the Ger-
man decision banning the display of crucifixes in public class-
rooms was a proportionate response to the greater intrusion on 
those of other sects on the all-day presence of such a religious 
symbol (pp. 46-47).40 
Beatty acknowledges the provisions of the German consti-
tutional text that plainly contemplate a more active role for the 
state in promoting religious worship and thus markedly differ 
from those of the United States Constitution (pp. 50, 54),41 but 
does not analyze how the different textual commitments in 
Germany may affect the respective courts' analyses. Although 
he attributes the different results in U.S. and German constitu-
tional law of religious liberty and accommodation to an Ameri-
can predilection for "interpretivism" and the German commit-
ment to proportionality, he does not consider the possibility that 
the differing results reflect, not interpretive methodologies, but 
rather a set of sociolegal understandings of the relationship be-
tween state and religion, which are themselves reflected in the 
constitutions being interpreted. For example, while the German 
Basic Law incorporates provisions of the Weimar Constitution 
that prohibit a "state church," other incorporated provisions 
contemplate a substantial role for churches in public life, includ-
ing authorizations to churches to levy taxes (a power that many 
churches delegate to their state governments, which then pay the 
40. For Beatty, the "objective facts" are that having to stand or leave the room 
briefly during voluntary prayer for a dissenting student is a small burden, compared to 
the larger loss of religious freedom the majority would suffer by having to refrain from 
"collective, public" prayer in school; the harm for those opting out of prayer is not great 
and allowing a single student to trump the rights of religious students to express their 
beliefs is out of proportion to the injury it prevents. But the cross display is different be-
cause the burden on a nonbeliever of having to be confronted with a cross for the entire 
school day is disproportional to the benefit of majoritarian religious expression. Each 
case is determined by "pragmatic and impartial assessment of the facts"(p. 47). 
41. Beatty, as should be clear, is particularly critical of U.S. Establishment Clause 
cases restricting government acknowledgment or display of religion, which he attributes 
to the Court's "interpretive method" rather than to public constitutional choices re-
flected in the Establishment Clause itself: 
[T)he single most sweeping restriction that the interpretive method has imposed 
on the sovereignty of the American people to legislate their priorities and pref-
erences into law is the rule (in the Establishment Clause) that makes practically 
all state support of religious institutions and events unconstitutional. ... No 
matter how fundamental a community's spiritual beliefs are to its own self un-
derstanding, it is an inviolate rule that they can play no part in the enactment of 
any law (p. 54). 
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taxes over to the church),42 which powers are wholly inconsistent 
with the "wall of separation" contemplated by Thomas Jeffer-
son's metaphor for the U.S. Establishment Clause.43 Moreover, 
as Beatty recognizes, the German Basic Law's provisions state 
that "[r]eligious instruction shall form part of the curriculum in 
state schools except non-denominational schools," and provide 
that "parents and guardians shall have the right to decide 
whether children receive religious instruction. "44 But such provi-
sions cast in a very different light the German court's decision on 
school prayer in an interdenominational school: in holding that 
the school could offer voluntary prayer so long as dissenting stu-
dents could opt out, the Court arguably followed the model laid 
down in the constitution for religious instruction in public 
schools.45 
Current judicial practices, then, do not establish propor-
tionality as a superior mode of constitutional analysis exclusive 
of other conventional tools of constitutional analysis. That many 
courts engage in proportionality reasoning is not sufficient to es-
tablish its "integrity" over and above that of other frequently 
used forms of "interpretive" reasoning, including reliance on 
constitutional text and precedent.46 Although Beatty may well be 
right in describing the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions as notably 
dependent on precedent as compared to other constitutional 
courts that are more inclined to reason from basic normative 
principles,47 one finds reliance on constitutional text in many 
42. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 444, 485 (2d ed. 1997). 
43. This is not to say that the "wall" metaphor was the only one available within the 
U.S. tradition or that the text of the Constitution dictated its extension to the states, see 
e.g., Philip Hamburger, Separation and Interpretation, 18 J. L. & POL. 7 (2002), but rather 
that the text of the Constitution represents and forms a focal point for interpretive tradi-
tions and understandings now instantiated in the caselaw as well. 
44. Basic Law, Federal Republic of Germany [GG) Art. 7 (3), (2). 
45. See KOMMERS, supra note 42, at 471. By contrast, in the United States, it is es-
tablished that "[a) State may neither allow public-school students to receive religious in-
struction on public-school premises, [Illinois ex rei. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Cham-
paign County,) 333 U.S. 203 (1948), nor allow religious-school students to receive state-
sponsored education in their religious schools. [Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,] 473 
U.S. 373 (1985)." County of Allegheny v. American Qvil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 
590 n. 40 (1989). 
46. For a description of the methodology of proportionality that seems to locate it 
in existing doctrinal analysis, see Weinrib, supra note 19, at 19 (stating that proportional-
ity analysis rests in part on "fidelity to prior doctrinal analysis unless departure is demon-
strably warranted by constitutional principle," but emphasizing that the method does not 
strongly defer to tradition, practice or fact of democratic enactment in conducting its 
analysis). 
47. Beatty makes this claim in particular in comparing the U.S. Supreme Court and 
the German constitutional court (pp. 44-46), but it is a difficult claim to evaluate without 
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other court decisions-indeed, in some of the decisions Beatty 
discusses one finds that courts distinguish U.S. jurisprudence on 
the grounds that the U.S. Constitution, unlike theirs, has a non-
establishment clause.48 
Neutrality, Objectivity, Determinacy: Beatty argues that 
proportionality, by definition, is a neutral tool of analysis. Pro-
portionality includes "rationality (suitability)," and "necessity," 
which mark out illegitimate reasons, or the complete absence of 
legitimate reasons of any kind (p. 163). Moreover, "proportion-
ality tells governments and their officials that they have to have 
stronger and more compelling reasons for decisions that inflict 
heavy burdens and disadvantages on people than when the in-
fringements of rights and liberties are not as serious or painful" 
(p. 164).49 I agree with Beatty that proportionality can be given a 
neutral definition-such as that more compelling reasons are re-
quired to justify the infliction of more serious burdens. But pro-
portionality's neutrality as a definitional matter undermines its 
neutrality in the sense which for Beatty seems most important, 
that is, in its being a relatively determinate tool.50 
Beatty claims that "proportionality offers judges a clear and 
objective test to distinguish coercive action by the state that is 
reading German. Beatty relies on several translations from Donald Kommers' authorita-
tive work; Kommers himself notes that he has edited out numerous citations to the Ger-
man Court's own decisions in preparing the translations. See KOMMERS, supra note 42, at 
xviii. 
48. For example, Professor Beatty praises (pp. 62-63) the dissenting views of South 
African Constitutional Court Justice O'Regan in Solberg v. State, 1997 SACLR LEXIS 
30 (1997); her dissent, though, distinguishes the text of the U.S. Constitution's Estab-
lishment Clause from the South African Constitution's provision concerning religious 
freedom, stating that " [i)t is clear from [provisions of the South African constitution) 
that the strict approach of the United States Supreme Court to the provisions of the First 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America in relation to the sepa-
ration between the State and religious bodies has been avoided." ld. at '1'1116, 118. 
49. For this reason as well, he asserts, proportionality solves the problem of the ex-
tension of the constitution to private law-courts use the same principle, with differences 
in application arising from differences between public and private contexts. 
50. On the pliability of proportionality, see Grainne de Burca, The Principle of 
Proportionality and its Application in EC Law, in YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 1993 
(A. Barav & D.A. Wyatt eds., 1994), at 106-D7, 110-13 (distinguishing proportionality 
review focused on economic efficiency and that focused on incursions into protected 
rights; describing variation with which proportionality review is applied by the European 
Court of Justice); Paul Craig, Unreasonableness and Proponionality in UK Law, in THE 
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 100 (Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999) 
("proportionality can itself be applied more or less intensely, depending upon the nature 
of the case."); NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN 
EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 272 (1996) (noting ambiguity in whether 
proportionality principle prohibits measures whose costs exceed benefits or only those 
whose costs exceed their benefits 'too far'). 
820 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:803 
legitimate from that which is not," because it focuses on "the 
perspectives of those who are most affected .... Judgments are 
based on findings of facts about the parties' own evaluation of 
the significance of whatever government initiative or decision is 
before the court" (p. 166).51 Beatty argues that this party-based 
perspective reinforces the neutrality of judicial decisions: "Mak-
ing the perspectives of the parties the vantage from which courts 
judge each case means no particular philosophy or moral vision 
is privileged over any other" (p. 168). But, he argues, because 
parties can get caught up in a case and may exaggerate their 
claims, the court must make its own evaluation of how signifi-
cant the relevant law is for its detractors and defenders. 
It is in distinguishing those party-based perspectives that 
should be accepted, from those that should not be, that this as-
pect of Beatty's argument runs aground in its claim of determi-
nacy. For example, Beatty praises an opinion of Aharon Barak, 
President of the Israeli High Court, in a bitter dispute over 
whether to close a street in Jerusalem to traffic on the Jewish 
Sabbath. Barak's opinion concluded that a rule requiring street 
closure at the time of prayers was not an excessive burden on 
secular commuters residing outside the neighborhood, because 
there were alternative routes open, the street itself would be 
open during the Sabbath except during prayers, and the detour 
involved when the street was closed was no more than an extra 
two minutes.52 For Beatty, it was obvious that maintaining si-
51. Beatty offers a highly idealized understanding of judging: "When they stick to 
the facts, the personal sympathies of the judges towards the parties in the case never 
come into play" (p. 166). Beatty also downplays judicial concern for the effects of deci-
sion on hypothetical cases not before the court. See, e.g., id. at 171 ("Hypothetical argu-
ments also play no role [in legal reasoning about human rights] because they assume 
rather than evaluate the really critical facts."); id. at 56 (criticizing U.S. Court for defend-
ing decisions in Oregon v. Smith and Lee v. Weisman "by hypothesizing potentially ca-
lamitous consequences that might transpire if it ruled the other way"). The combination 
of these positions seems to place great weight on the situation of the particular parties 
before the court, even if their factual showings of burdens and benefits are atypical of 
others also affected by the challenged rule. But cf id. at 96 (suggesting that judges must 
"take the measure" of the significance of a rule both for the parties most directly affected 
and the public at large). 
52. See Horev v. Minister of Transp., HCJ 5016/96 (Sup. Ct. Isr., 1997), available at 
Supreme Court of Israel Website, http:l/elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/96/160/050/aOl/ 
96050160.a0l.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2005). The street closure issue arose out of the 
desire of the Orthodox community on Bar Han street-a main artery for traffic-to close 
the street for the entire Sabbath; the objections of secular commuters from outside the 
neighborhood to street closure as an impairment of their freedom of movement; and the 
further objections of secular residents of the neighborhood who, if the street stayed 
closed, would be unable to park their own cars near their homes if they wanted to drive 
out to visit others on the Sabbath. A majority of the judges, including Barak, held that it 
was legitimate to consider the religious concerns of the Sabbath observers who wanted 
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lence during prayers is more important than motorists having to 
take a "two minute[ ]" detour (p. 59). Although this intuition 
may be widely shared,53 Beatty also seems to approve the "pro-
portionality" of allowing commuters to pass through the reli-
gious community at other times during the Sabbath, notwith-
standing objection of the religious residents of the street.54 Yet 
given the brevity of the detour required, the balance between 
the interests of drivers and the interests of the Orthodox in the 
rest of the day may seem less obvious to others. 
Beatty asserts that "it is possible to determine, as a matter 
of fact, whether ... the mobility rights of motorists in Jerusalem 
were as serious as they claimed by looking at how the state's 
proposed course of action actually affected their larger life sto-
ries" (p. 73). Beatty's focus on facts leads him, as well, in his dis-
cussion of religious liberty, to treat both interests-interests in 
driving, interests in religious observance-as comparable. Yet, 
applying proportionality to measure the relative inconvenience 
of, for example, an entire day of no driving on a major road 
against the religious community's desire to preserve the quiet of 
the Sabbath, seems to me to defy ready resolution through pro-
portionality without knowing answers to prior questions about 
the degree and tradition of legal protection accorded the differ-
ent individual rights in play and about the institutional roles of 
nonjudicial decisionmakers; and even with this knowledge, it is 
not clear how commensurable are the interests in religious ob-
servance and in freedom to drive. 
Beatty's views of the objectivity of facts depend on contest-
able assumptions that determining the role of a particular claim 
of right in a person's "larger life story" is a "fact" that has "cer-
the street closed and that an order requiring the street to be closed during the hours of 
prayer, but not all day, on the Sabbath appropriately accommodated the interests of the 
religiously observant with those of the commuters; but the court continued in effect a 
temporary order suspending the limited closure and remanded the issue to the govern-
ment to more fully consider the position of the secular residents of the neighborhood. 
53. For helpful reflections on intuition or "common sense," see DANIEL FARBER & 
SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 57-58 (2002) (suggesting that what common sense 
"can best offer [is] not starting points for grand [constitutional] theory but a sense of re-
ality"). 
54. Compare Beatty, p. 59 (suggesting some uncertainty about the "proportional-
ity" of a decision to allow motorists during the Sabbath, by remarking that "[a]t least dur-
ing the times when prayers were being said, the proportionalities-in the significance of 
the closing for the two communities-were clear.") with id. (apparently approving the 
decision not to close the street at other times during the Sabbath: "Toleration required 
orthodox Jews to show the same measure of respect for the life choices of their secular 
countrymen that the partial closing guaranteed for them"). 
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tainty, predictability and reality" allowing "more precise meas-
urement and analysis" (p. 73). Difficulties in this claim emerge 
from a comparison of his treatment of facts in different cases. In 
Lee v. Weisman, for example, Beatty criticizes the U.S. Supreme 
Court for inattention to the facts, including the "fact" that Deb-
orah Weisman did not object to the reference to God in the 
Pledge of Allegiance which, Beatty says, suggested that the pub-
lic prayer was not a significant intrusion on her beliefs; the rights 
of the majority to hear from a minister at graduation should not 
have been subordinated to her small interest in not having such a 
public expression of religion (p. 53). Beatt~ is also critical of the 
ECHR's decision in Valsamis v. Greece, 5 rejecting a pacifist 
family's challenge to their children's participation in a parade (p. 
67). For Beatty, the Court erred in refusing to accept the family's 
perspective that the mandatory school parade celebrating "Na-
tional Day" was offensive to their pacifist belief and substituted 
its own perception of the significance of the parade. In evaluat-
ing the family's claim that the children's participation in the pa-
rade was inconsistent with their pacifist commitments, the Euro-
pean Commission and Court took note of a distinction between 
school parades and military parades 56 In Lee, Beatty argues, a 
particular fact-the absence of Weisman's objection to the 
words "under God" in the Pledge-should have caused the 
Court to evaluate Weisman's claim more independently. Beatty 
does not explain his own different evaluation of the facts and 
willingness to disagree with the challengers' perspectives in one 
but not the other of these two cases. 57 
55. [1996] Eur. a. H.R. 27, (1997) 24 EHRR 294. 
56. 24 EHRR at 305--06 (Commission, especially H 39-40), id. at 314-18 (Court's 
judgment especially H 23, 24, 31). The dissenters, by contrast, argued that the Valsamis' 
"perception of the symbolism of the school parade ... has to be accepted by the Court 
unless it is obviously unfounded and unreasonable," which, in their view, it was not, id. at 
321 (Vilhjalmsson, J. and Jambrek, J., dissenting). The national day commemorated the 
outbreak of war between Greece and Fascist Italy. 
57. Perhaps Beatty would account for this difference by noting that in Weisman, he 
looked at the behavior of the challenger herself while the European court in Valsamis 
relied on a fact that was not about the pacifist family itself but about the nature of the 
march; but elsewhere Beatty has treated the nature of an activity, such as a short com-
mute, as bearing on the relative significance of an objection. Alternatively he might say, 
along with the dissenters in Valsamis, that given the nature of the holiday the fa~~y's 
view was not "obviously unfounded and unreasonable," supra note 56; but by smular 
logic, factual distinctions between a clergy person's offering a prayer and a two-word ref-
erence to God in an otherwise secular pledge might make Weisman's objection to the 
former not "obviously unfounded and unreasonable," notwithstanding an asserted failure 
to object to the latter. 
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Beatty argues that it is by considering the facts from the 
vantage of those most affected that the impartiality of propor-
tionality analysis is assured (p. 73).58 He also asserts that "objec-
tive" facts permit the court independently to evaluate those van-
tage points,59 which is necessary because the parties may 
incorrectly evaluate the significance of their own claims. The dif-
ficulty, as already noted, is in distinguishing what situations do 
and do not warrant rejection of the challengers' own evalua-
tion.60 Moreover, Beatty's own examples illustrate that courts 
may invoke proportionality analysis but come to a conclusion 
with which Beatty disagrees: for example, Beatty criticizes the 
South African Court in President of the Republic of South Africa 
v. Hugo,61 for failing to accept the viewpoint of single fathers 
who challenged a presidential pardon releasing from prison only 
mothers of young children. But the opinions of the judges sup-
porting the constitutionality of the President's pardon used con-
cerns of proportionality to at least as great an extent as the lone 
dissent, which emphasized the inconsistency of the pardons with 
commitments to overcoming gender inequalities and the stereo-
types on which they rest. 62 
58. Beatty's argument here is premised on the idea that facts are more objective 
than words to be interpreted and that the courts can act as impartial arbiters by focusing 
on the parties' accounts. 
59. Although Beatty's general view is that in most cases "courts could rely on the 
parties' own evaluations of how significant the law was to them," (p. 74), in these reli-
gious liberty cases it seems evident-on Beatty's own description-that one cannot. 
60. Another example: Beatty treats Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), as cor-
rect, even though the Court apparently disagreed with the plaintiffs characterization of 
the effects of a public display of traditionally religious symbols. Indeed, Beatty praises 
the U.S. Court for its "meticulous" attention to facts in the public display of religious 
symbols cases, Lynch and Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (p. 49). In Lynch, the 
Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that public display of a Nativity scene appeared to be 
an endorsement of the religious element of the creche, creating fear in them that a domi-
nant religious group would impose its views on others; the Court insisted on the secular 
character of the display. Both the Court's rejection of plaintiffs' own description of their 
interests and its willingness to ignore the Christian nature of the Nativity display are ar-
guably in tension with Beatty's praise of the Court as giving "meticulous" attention to the 
facts. In Allegheny County, the Court likewise rejected the views of objectors that the 
display of a menorah near a Christmas tree involved a prohibited state endorsement of 
religion, again characterizing the display as secular, but concluded that a creche displayed 
on a staircase within City Hall was an establishment of religion, accepting in part and 
rejecting in part the harms claimed by the plaintiffs. Although Beatty might say that "ob-
jectively" a person's "life story" is not harmed by the public religious observances of oth-
ers (even with government support), or is not harmed as much by such public obser-
vances of others as by restrictions on (or demands for) one's own religious worship, these 
arguments do not distinguish Lynch from Allegheny. 
61. 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
62. The majority justices noted the far smaller proportion of single fathers who 
cared for young children compared to mothers, and the far larger number of male pris-
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Beatty argues that it is when courts fail to apply proportion-
ality analysis in an even-handed way that they tend to err in re-
solving important constitutional claims (pp. 87, 98, 112, 167).63 
He astutely points out that in challenges to gendered classifica-
tions that exclude women from opportunities available for men, 
many constitutional courts abandon ''interpretivism" and rely on 
forms of proportionality analysis, in which a classification which 
excludes women entirely and thus substantially infringes their 
interests is undermined by close examination of the purported 
purposes and fit. By contrast, Beatty notes, many courts retreat 
to "interpretivism" when confronted with claims of gay or lesbi-
ans to equality of treatment. 
Beatty's explanation for the lack of success of gays and les-
bians in many constitutional challenges focuses on courts' failure 
to understand facts64 and use of the wrong interpretive ap-
proaches.65 But courts may use "interpretive" approaches when 
their own commitments to equality do not extend to gays and 
lesbians. In other words, Beatty treats the methodology (inter-
pretivism vs. proportionality) as cause, rather than symptom, of 
the Courts' unwillingness to extend to gays and lesbians the 
same protections. But the degree of commitment to equality as a 
oners than female prisoners, concluding that, if relief had to be extended to both single 
fathers and single mothers, it was unlikely that any parents of young children would be 
released, thus arguably taken into account the perspectives of both male and female par-
ents. /d. at 25 (Goldstone, J.). For the one judge in the majority who found a violation of 
the equality provisions of the interim constitution, the measure was nonetheless found 
justified under the proportionality analysis mandated by Section 33. /d. at 42, 47 (Mok· 
goro, J.). Justice Kriegler's dissent focused on the centrality of gender equality to the 
South African constitution, concluding that the long-term harm to dispelling gender 
stereotypes about family care far outweighed the short term benefits to a small number 
of released women prisoners. Id. at 34-37 (Kriegler, J.). Neither proportionality nor 
pragmatism dictates where the balance is struck. Cf. Mark Kende, Stereotypes in South 
African and American Constitutional Law: Achieving Gender Equality and Transforma-
tion, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 3, 5 (2000) (characterizing Hugo as embody-
ing a "pragmatic interpretive philosophy"). Beatty acknowledges (p. 98), in the face of 
decisions ostensibly applying proportionality analysis but getting the answer wrong, that 
the principle of proportionality does not "provide judges with automatic, self-enforcing 
rules." 
63. See also BEATIY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 57, 59. 
64. "[F)acts that are critical to their cases are either misunderstood or ignored" (p. 
102), because courts used interpretive approaches in resolving equality challenges 
brought by gays and lesbians focusing (in his view, incorrectly) on what the framers of a 
constitution would have intended, or prior judicial precedent, or on institutional modesty 
and deference to legislative decisions (p. 103). 
65. The presence of cases rejecting gender equality claims, he indicates, does not 
suggest that "sex discrimination is not a matter of right or wrong," or that the law laid 
down by courts is not made up of principles; rather, "it is precisely when judges fail to 
apply the principles of proportionality even-handedly that rules" disadvantaging people 
because of their gender are found constitutional (p. 87). 
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principle may be the key determinant, rather than the choice of 
methodologies.66 And if so, it is substantive values rather than 
commitments to proportionality as a neutral principle of deci-
sionmaking that play the central role.67 
II. "ULTIMATE" LAW, LEGITIMATE ENDS, 
PROPORTIONALITY AND EQUALITY: WHERE DO 
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES COME FROM? 
For Beatty it is important to deny that courts applying pro-
portionality analysis are engaged in substantive value choices, 
for part of his claim is that the method is neutral and driven by 
facts. Tht! neutrality of the method is part of his response to the 
tension between democratic self-governance and judicial review 
of government actions under the proportionality standard. 
Beatty argues that in addition to being more determinate, the 
neutrality and objectivity of the method-including judicial ac-
ceptance of government ends-helps reconcile proportionality 
review with self-governance. He says: 
Like scales of justice, judges have no say on the worth of what 
is put on each side of the balance. When reviewing the legiti-
macy of laws that make having an abortion a crime, for exam-
ple, when life and death issues really are at stake, it tells 
judges they have no authority to second guess how a commu-
nity thinks about the deep philosophical and spiritual mean-
ings of life ... (p. 167). 
Thus, for example, courts cannot decide that a fetus is or is not a 
life entitled to protection, but must go by what the community 
decides (p. 67).68 Justice, he says, "is a local, not a universal 
ideal"- it differs from law in this way (p. 167). Depending on the 
66. For example (pp. 84--85), Beatty notes the Israeli court's striking down of an 
exclusion of women from serving as military pilots, based on "facts" of women's service 
in other military departments. But considered in light of decisions such as Sirciar v. Sec. 
of State for Defence, (1999] E.C.R. 1-7403 (upholding exclusion of women from British 
marine units as consistent with demands of proportionality because of the purported 
need for "interoperability" in combat readiness), perhaps the Israeli court's decision re-
flects a stronger moral commitment to gender equality more than a methodological 
commitment to proportionality analysis. 
67. It may well be that in resolving claims under older constitutions, it is particu-
larly important to be open to modes of interpretation that are not narrowly intentionalist 
in order to accommodate principled claims of equality for previously subordinated 
groups. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism 
and Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265, 270-81 (2003). 
68. Beatty does not here explain on what principled basis to make the choice be-
tween the community's decision and an individual's decision. See also (p. 33). 
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prior moral choices of a society, the proportionalities can vary, 
and abortion could be either lawful or not (p. 168).69 
This claim of objectivity for proportionality analysis raises a 
number of difficulties. First, Beatty provides only a scant frame-
work to discriminate between those moral visions on which a 
community can decide, as it were, prior to proportionality anal~­
sis, and those "illegitimate" ends precluded to the body politic. 0 
Beatty does say that morally legitimate ends must reflect the 
equal moral worth of each person, in the sense of providing o~­
portunity for each person's views to be considered (p. 172). 1 
Beatty also indicates that government action designed only to 
harm persons or to act inconsistent with "formal equality of ... 
autonomy" is illegitimate (pp. 174-75).72 But the lack of clarity 
about the implications of these two positions is reflected in some 
contradictions within the book itself. 
For example, in the course of critiquing Dworkin's moral 
reasoning approach to constitutional interpretation for its inde-
terminacy, Beatty says: "On gay rights, for example, justice de-
mands that they be given the same level of protection against 
discrimination as every one else but the jurisprudence, at least in 
the United States, provides considerably less." (p. 29 (emphasis 
added)).73 Later on, however, in his defense of the neutrality of 
69. "When all the relevant interests are measured against the principle of propor-
tionality, the results in both cases [upholding and rejecting women's rights to abortion] 
are right" (p. 168). 
70. Cf. Christoph Engel, The Constitutional Court-Applying the Proportionality 
Principle-as a Subsidiary Authority for the Assessment of Political Outcomes, in 
LINKING POLITICS AND LAW 285, 308 (Christop Engel & Adrienne Heritier eds., 2003) 
("the other three tests of the proportionality principle become pointless if the legislator is 
free to define the legitimate aim."). 
71. He writes: "Proportionality ... [is not] value free. The principle assumes that all 
who participate in a debate about the legitimacy of some course of action carried out by 
or with the blessing of the state are, at least for purpose of the debate, each other's 
equal." Thus, the "normative conception of equality ... underlies the principle of pro-
portionality"(p. 172). 
72. He writes: "The only politics that proportionality prohibits is the politics of ex-
tremism and hate. Laws can't be passed that label some as inferior to others. The formal 
equality of each person's autonomy means everyone's rights are the same. States owe the 
same duty to each person who is subject to their rule. Except for that one constraint, 
proportionality leaves it entirely to the people to decide what their projects and priorities 
will be. Once it is established that a law doesn't directly challenge the equal moral au-
thority each person possesses over his or her life, politicians can pursue just about any 
purpose they please" (pp. 174-75). 
73. He goes on to note that under U.S. constitutional law, gays and lesbians (unlike 
women and racial minorities) "can only insist that governments act rationally, not that 
they also be fair. Precedent and principle hold out very different futures for lesbians and 
gays, and judges are, on Dworkin's theory, entirely unconstrained in deciding which to-
morrow will see the dawn of another day" (p. 29). 
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proportionality analysis, he seems to suggest that what "justice" 
requires with respect to gay marriage may vary widely. Thus, he 
explains that in proportionality analysis: 
[e]ach point of view carries the same moral weight in the 
analysis. There is no universal, a priori answer to the question 
whether abortion is murder, or whether people of the same 
sex can marry each other that holds true all over the world. 
For the purpose of determining what rights foetuses, gays, and 
the poor can claim against the state, each ethical perspective 
that respects the equal standing of conflicting opinions is enti-
tled to have its position evaluated fairly and according to the 
evidence that shows it in the best possible light (p. 172). 
Perhaps Beatty would reconcile these statements by explaining 
his first comment as one based on what "justice" requires in the 
United States or Canada, and not as a universal claim: "Neutral-
ity also entails recognizing that what is just, what is in proper 
proportion, in any case is particular to each community"(p. 167). 
But this explanation leads to the question of how courts deter-
mine what are the principles of justice in their own societies.74 
Beatty does not develop how a court is to discern what the 
moral choices of society are- for example, whether to be gov-
erned by choices reflected in foundational documents (like con-
stitutions) or in enforced statutes. It is possible that he would re-
gard founding texts, such as the U.S. Constitution, the German 
Basic Law or the Israeli Declaration of Independence, as guide-
posts to the particularized "moral vision," that the proportional-
ity test serves- but such a move would re-introduce textual in-
terpretation (at least at the level of determining specific 
constitutional values) that Beatty seems reluctant to embrace. 
Moreover, Beatty fails to distinguish between those conclu-
sions about the meaning of life that must be secured to each in-
dividual's decision (something we might call a "right") and those 
appropriate for community decisionmaking.75 Whether this is 
74. Beatty's reference to the particularized views of particular communities raises 
broader and difficult questions, beyond this essay, about the relationship of law to con-
ventional morality. For discussion of the classic debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lord 
Devlin, see, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitu-
tion: Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT'L L. J. 353, 358-59 (2004); Kent Greenawalt, Legal 
Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 710, 722-23 (1995). 
75. Beatty criticizes Dworkin's moral reasoning approach because allowing judges 
to decide on abortion or euthanasia "constitutes a massive derogation from the authority 
of each person and the sovereignty of the people as a whole to decide the great questions 
of life and death for themselves" (p. 33). The formulation strikes me as odd, because so 
much of constitutional law involves deciding whether it is the person, or the community, 
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because Beatty does not believe in the idea of nontrumpable 
"rights," but only in "interests," as some passages in this book 
suggest (p. 171 ), or because Beatty believes in universal human 
rights (which do not extend to certain reproductive or life and 
death decisions), is unclear. As noted, Beatty does argue that 
law cannot "challenge the equal moral authority each person 
possesses over his or her life," because otherwise government 
could pursue anything it wanted, and thus, he says, the "principle 
of proportionality takes all benign purposes as given" (p. 175 
(emphasis added)).76 Beatty's argument here seems to require 
reliance on implicit theories of rights or universal principles, and 
yet these remain under-developed and indeed, at times, ob-
scured by the language of proportionality. 
For example, in his final chapter Beatty argues that propor-
tionality provides a "neutral principle" for Brown v. Board of 
Education because telling black children that they cannot be 
educated in the same school as white children is "brutally offen-
sive to their dignity and self-worth in a way that" forcing white 
children to share the classroom is not (p. 186). He goes on to 
recognize the problem of analysis based on "interests" alone, ar-
guing that "[s]egregationists may be deeply offended by having 
to mix with people with whom they want no association, but 
their stature and status in the community is not diminished by 
their forced integration"(p. 186). But to the extent that whites' 
status in fact was relative, and dependent on their perceiving 
themselves as hierarchically superior to that of blacks, ending 
segregation may indeed have diminished their status. 
What Beatty must mean, I think, is that their legitimate in-
terests in status and stature, their right to be treated with "hu-
man dignity," is not impaired by integration. But such a state-
ment cannot be drawn from an unadulterated principle of 
proportionality that accepts existing government's ends as le-
gitimate. Nor can it be drawn by the parties' "own evaluation" of 
their interests. Rather, it requires a principled concept of the le-
gal entitlements or endowments (or "rights") of human beings.77 
which is "sovereign" over particular decisions. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, Public Princi-
ple and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Consti-
tutional Law, 96 YALE L. J. 1006 (1987) (theorizing judicial review as necessary to main-
tain shifting boundary between areas governed by universalist as opposed to particularist 
values). 
76. Beatty's reliance on the principle of "equal moral authority" seems closely re-
lated to Dworkinian moral reasoning of a sort Beatty elsewhere rejects, see supra note 
75. 
77. In discussing the South African Court's decision in Hugo, Beatty says, the 
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Proportionality alone cannot provide us with the principled val-
ues on which its operational analysis must rest. Beatty's propor-
tionality rests, as he acknowledges, on a foundational commit-
ment to equality (and not, I think, just the formal equality of 
consideration of views, but a much more substantive version of 
equality). This commitment informs virtually all of Beatty's 
analysis. For those whose foundational commitments are to 
other values, or to other more formal conceptions of equality, 
proportionality analysis might yield very different results. 
III. PROPORTIONALITY, TRANSPARENCY AND 
DETERMINACY 
In this section, I advance some very tentative thoughts 
about the benefits of proportionality analysis in constitutional 
adjudication. I begin by agreeing with Beatty's implicit claim 
that proportionality captures a kind of common sense view of 
justice78 - that greater harms should mean greater punishment, 
that greater burdens on individuals require greater justifications. 
Part of its attraction is the universality, at some level, of such 
conceptions of justice, and their correspondence to common un-
derstandings of the function of constitutionalism. Given these 
intuitions, proportionality analysis has a number of advantages. 
First, explicit attention to proportionality increases the transpar-
ency of judicial decision, framing a structure for exploring con-
cerns likely to be relevant to judges and lawyers in a significant 
swathe of constitutional decision-making. Second, proportional-
ity analysis, as it is practiced in countries like Canada, meets 
judges "dismissed Hugo's own self-understanding as not worthy of the Court's respect. 
Rather than accepting the way Hugo and other single fathers perceived their treatment 
by the state, they became partisan players in the case" (p. 97). But I think Beatty would 
agree that the "self-understanding" of segregationists should not have been accepted by 
the Brown Court. 
78. One of Beatty's implicit claims is that proportionality corresponds to important 
conceptions of justice: proportionality analysis helps discriminate between the "good" 
and the "bad" effects of government action, and prevents majoritarian "excess" and 
"abuse." (pp. 182-83, 3) Indeed, he argues: 
when judges test the decisions of politicians and their officials against the prin-
ciple of proportionality, human rights are better protected and the sovereignty 
of the people more respected simultaneously. Proportionality establishes a met-
ric to resolve conflicts between majorities and minorities that renders justice to 
both .... (By] evaluat[ing) the intensity of people's subjective preferences ob-
jectively, it can guarantee more freedom and equality than any rival theory has 
been able to provide (p. 172). 
Despite the somewhat extravagant language, such passages suggest that proportionality 
corresponds with common sense notions of justice and fairness, while assuring that de-
gree of objectivity and impartiality that must typify judicial, rather than political, deci-
sionmaking. 
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some of the critiques of judicial balancing by its efforts to elicit 
attention not only to individual interests at stake, but also to 
specific, nonformulaic justifications from the government that 
address alternative mechanisms.79 Third, proportionality's atten-
tion to particular facts helps make it a flexible tool both for pro-
tecting rights and maintaining constitutional law as an effective 
legal constraint on government over time. 
Transparency and Constitutionalism. One of the purposes of 
constitutionalism itself is to provide for government that is both 
effective in governing and respectful of individual rights. Propor-
tionality focuses on questions that seem to go directly to this 
purpose. Its attention to the individual parties' claims of injury 
or entitlement, the legitimate governmental purposes at stake, 
and the means available, and chosen, to satisfy those purposes, 
corresponds to widely-held conceptions of fairness and of how 
tensions between the individual and her government should be 
resolved.80 Proportionality in one form or another is thus widely 
used in what Beatty's earlier work called the "justification" 
phase of constitutional adjudication of rights claims, 81 to test the 
relationship between legitimate purpose and means used and to 
screen out legislation that in fact has an impermissible purpose-
that is, a purpose inconsistent with basic constitutional values.82 
79. Whether commitments to proportionality require case-by-case adjudication 
rather than more formal rules, or should exclude concern for text, precedents, and insti-
tutional roles, is another matter, discussed infra, text accompanying notes 108-118. 
80. Something akin to proportionality analysis is reflected in the U.S. Supreme 
Court's equal protection and substantive due process jurisprudence, requiring that sub-
stantial intrusions on highly important individual interests be justified only by the most 
compelling of government interests through means meeting "narrow tailoring" require-
ments, as well as in the formulation of procedural due process analysis found in Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance 
and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening up the Conversation on "Proportionality," 
Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 609 (1999). These analyses have ana-
logues in public law adjudication around the world. See, e.g., HILAIRE BARNETT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 868-920 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing judi-
cial review of administrative action in the U.K. under doctrines of ultra vires, unreason-
ableness, and proportionality); Itzhak Zamir, Unreasonableness, Balance of Interests and 
Proportionality, in PuBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 327 (ltzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 
1996). 
81. See BEATfY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 2. 
82. Although proportionality cannot, by itself, determine what purposes are illicit, 
it can be used to help screen legislation for purposes that are deemed impermissible on 
other grounds. Thus, the "proportionality and congruence" test of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997) has been viewed by some as a device to screen legislation for illicit consti-
tutional purposes. See Jackson, supra note 80, at 628; see also Evan H. Caminker, "Ap-
propriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1127, 1178-79, 
1188 (2001). Proportionality analysis may also be invoked as a tool for mediating con-
flicts between two sets of constitutional rights or values, like freedom of expression and 
freedom from invidious discrimination. For a possible example, seeR. v. Keegstra, (1990] 
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Because the concerns embraced under the idea of propor-
tionality correspond with widely shared notions of fairness and 
with some of the larger purposes of constitutionalism, they are 
likely to be present in judges' thinking about the correct resolu-
tion of at least some cases (especially in relatively less settled ar-
eas of law) that come before them. To the extent that one be-
lieves that jud~es' written reasons should reflect what motivates 
their decision, there are advantages to a doctrinal framework 
that allows them to put in writing their analyses of the propor-
tionalities of the situation before them.84 Writing, as we have all 
experienced, can have a salutary effect on the thinker and also 
has the benefit of permitting responses and challenge to analyses 
that may be motivating a decision.85 Transparency and account-
ability of judicial decision-making (that accountability which 
comes from public and judicial reflection on and critique of the 
decisions) might thus be improved through more formalized 
written consideration of factors going to the fairness and justifi-
ability of the intrusions on individual interests that are at the 
heart of proportionality analysis. Although the efficacy of rea-
son-giving in promoting accountability and constraint can be 
contested, there are significant differences between decisional 
structures that strive for reasoned decision and those that do not, 
3 S.C.R. 697. 
83. See Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 16, 22-23 (1988) ("[W]hat a judge really does in his mind in reaching a 
decision should appear on paper .... Unless real reasons are laid on the table, there is no 
chance for a meaningful response or any useful dialogue."); David Shapiro, In Defense of 
Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (placing special weight on need for 
candor in judicial reason-giving to enable reasons given in precedents to have appropri-
ate constraining effect); cf Jeffrey Rosen, Foreword, 1999 Survey of Books Relating to 
The Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1337 (1999) ("The qualities of a great judicial opin-
ion-transparency, candor in the face of uncertainty, and analytical depth-are precisely 
those qualities that are most conducive to public accountability."). 
84. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 34-35 (2001) (suggesting 
that reason-giving requirement in administrative law has been unsatisfactory because it 
excludes "discourses of justice and authenticity"). 
85. Cf. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 245, 270-
72 (2002) (arguing that more "literalist" approach "does not escape subjectivity," for lan-
guage, history and tradition "provide little objective guidance in hardest cases" but in-
stead will "produce a decision that is no less subjective but which is far less transparent 
than a decision that directly addresses consequences in constitutional terms"). It might 
nonetheless be argued that written opinions should refer only to more autonomous-
seeming analyses of legal text, rules or precedents, even if judges are aware of other mo-
tivations for their own decisions, based on a pragmatic judgment that courts will better 
be able to carry out their functions in the long run if some aspects of their decisionmak-
ing are not fully explained. Whether to believe in the value of such nondisclosure may 
depend on different legal cultures. But on the whole default rules of interpretation 
should favor candid evaluation of those factors motivating decision. 
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with reason-giving tending to promote both self-awareness and 
constraint. 86 
Structured Deliberation and the Critique of Balancing: Al-
though Beatty has insisted at times on distinguishing proportion-
ality from balancing (pp. 92-93), proportionality analysis shares 
certain characteristics of balancing approaches, as both may be 
distinguished from more categorical or conceptual forms of 
analysis.87 Balancing has come under serious critique by constitu-
tional scholars both for its tendency to erode the power of con-
stitutional rights to constrain governments and for its inability to 
constrain judges from enacting personal views into law.88 The 
purported scientism of the metaphor of balancing, it can be ar-
86. Consider Professor Mashaw's comment on the value of reason-giving in the 
administrative context: 
As (the] argument goes ... Reasons really are small things to put in a jar. They 
are the pathetic coinage with which the powerful buy off the powerless in a le-
gitimacy game that preserves the hegemony of the hegcmons. There is some 
truth to these claims, of course, but they simultaneously prove too much and of-
fer too little. They suggest at their most extravagant that there is no real differ-
ence between the administrative rationality of the U.S. Social Security admini-
stration and the administrative rationality of the Rwandan military police. 
Mashaw, supra note 84, at 28-29. Reason-giving tends to produce more self-aware deci· 
sionmaking; the presence of a reasoned opinion provides more of a guide, and hence a 
constraint, to subsequent decisionmakers than an unreasoned judgment; and the procc· 
dural justice satisfaction for those subject to the courts' judgment of knowing they-in 
their individual contexts-have been heard is unfairly characterized as "pathetic coin-
age." 
87. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943, 945 (1987) (distinguishing balancing from approaches like totality of cir· 
cumstances tests designed to determine whether "some conception" of what constitutes 
the constitutionally protected or prohibited act has occurred); see also Kent Greenawalt, 
Free Speech in the United States and Ca.nadil, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6--7 (1992) 
(distinguishing "balancing" approaches in which "crucial factors" are openly weighed 
from "conceptual approaches" that use categorical analysis). 
88. For thoughtful discussion, see Aleinikoff, supra note 87, at 986-91, 973-77. See 
also Frank H. Easterbrook, What's So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 
781 (1990) (critiquing balancing and multi-factor approaches as inconsistent with having 
rules of law). A further critique is that judicial "balancing" ends up being review of rea· 
sonableness in which courts simply second-guess a properly legislative judgment. See Al-
einikoff, supra note 87, at 984-85. But it is unclear whether legislatures always will, or 
can, consider the reasonableness of statutory schemes, especially as they may apply in 
particular circumstances, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 
2002 SUP. Cr. REv. 343, 383-90 (discussing "limits of congressional foresight"), and thus 
judicial review may in such cases be the only safeguard. Morever, as Aleinikoff notes, 
what courts do in these cases can be understood not as replicating the legislature's func-
tion, but as using legislative judgments on social interests to inform the courts' special 
role of protecting constitutional rights. See Aleinikoff, supra note 87, at 986. Even where 
a legislative body has deliberated on the balance between social and individual interests, 
judicial review of the proportionality of its actions with respect to basic constitutional 
values can be undertaken with appropriate respect for legislative judgment as to the pub-
lic interests at stake. Cf Coffin, supra note 83, at 21 (referring to courts' historic "moni· 
toring function under the Constitution"). 
2004] BOOK REVIEWS 833 
gued, obscures the inevitability of judicial judgment about con-
stitutional values.89 
Proportionality's questions, as developed in Canadian and 
European jurisprudence, may help move analysis beyond the 
crude balancing of costs and benefits associated, unfavorably, 
with balancing in the U.S. tradition.90 By requiring consideration 
of the government interest being promoted and the nature of the 
constitutional right or interest being infringed, as well as of the 
need-in comparison to other less restrictive alternatives-for 
the particular measures at stake, Oakes-like proportionality tests 
become multi-dimensional in a way that, if taken seriously, 
might move the decisional mind away from simple-minded com-
parison or "balance." The need to explore whether there are al-
ternative means of protecting the interests by which the govern-
ment justifies its actions with less sacrifice to the private right-
before reaching the question whether the challenged measure is 
likely to confer a benefit proportional to the harm it causes to 
protected rights-also makes the justification requirement into 
something more qualitatively exacting than a crude "weighing" 
of values (that may be incommensurable in important re-
spects ).91 Indeed, the very language of proportionality itself sug-
89. Cf. Aleinikoff, supra note 87, at 992-94 (discussing "scientific" balancing); id. at 
100~5 (need for new metaphors in place of "feigned mathematical precision"). 
90. See generally EMILIOU, supra note 50; Somek, supra note 28, at 302; KOMMERS, 
supra note 42, at 46 (comparing German proportionality analysis to U.S. "strict scru-
tiny"); THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE (Evelyn Ellis 
ed., 1999). For a description of German public law emphasizing the role of constitutional 
values in proportionality analysis of constitutional questions, see Zoller, supra note 9, at 
581--83 ("Crucial for the determination of the appropriate character of the relationship 
between ends and means of parliamentary enactments are Articles 1-19 of the Constitu-
tion, which enumerate the fundamental rights of the German people, together with Arti-
cle 20(1), which provides: 'The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social 
federal state."'). Thus, per Zoller, proportionality analysis "strictly speaking"occurs only 
after evaluations of rationality and necessity and within boundaries established by consti-
tutional "values" of democracy, federalism, the social state and fundamental rights. 
91. See supra notes 89, 90. For a recent application of the minimal impairment as-
pect of proportionality to invalidate a statute in Canada, see R. v. Demers, (2004) 2 
S.C.R. 489 (invalidating law that prohibited absolute discharge of one accused of crime 
but mentally unfit to stand trial because of permanent mental disorder). Under such 
tests, much will depend on the level of generality or specificity with which governmental 
interests are formulated, which will in turn affect the degree of fit and availability of 
other alternatives to the end. Compare, e.g., RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Attorney General, 
(1995)3 S.C.R. 199, 327-28, 339-49 (McLachlin, J.) (invalidating ban on tobacco adver-
tising; concluding that goal of advertising ban was to decrease tobacco consumption mo-
tivated by advertising and concluding that goal might be served as well by ban on "life-
style" advertising while allowing advertising to encourage customers to switch from one 
brand to another) with id. at 274--84, 306--19 (LaForest, J. dissenting) (purpose of ban is 
to decrease health detriments from smoking and rejecting argument that partial ban 
would be as effective as total ban in light of that purpose and experience of other coun-
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gests that some more qualititative judgment is called for than the 
metaphor of weighing (with its implicit invocation of scales) 
conveys.92 
Proportionality analysis under the Oakes standard, then, 
may produce more structured consideration of constitutional 
values. In so doing, it facilitates response, argument and review 
by judges.93 Further, by requiring that justifications be advanced 
in terms of consistency with basic constitutional commitments, 
e.g., to "a free and democratic society,"94 proportionality analysis 
invites "participation in the reasoning process that sustains val-
ues that inform the rights-protecting instrument,"95 thereby 
meeting concerns that balancing falsely ~nores the social inter-
est in the protection of individual rights. While proportionality 
analysis may not always fulfill the promise its most ardent advo-
cates envision, its doctrinal aspects offer some hope for more 
careful, and open, reasoning about constitutional values.97 
tries). 
92. Cf. RJR-MacDonald, [1995]3 S.C.R. at 270 (LaForest, J., dissenting) (empha-
sizing that proportionality analysis is not a "test" but "an unavoidably normative inquiry, 
requiring the courts to take into account both the nature of the infringed right and the 
specific values and principles upon which the state seeks to justify the infringement" in 
light of Charter Section 1's commitment to protecting Charter values in a "free and de-
mocratic society"); Pildes, supra note 16, at 734-36 (contrary to implications of "balanc-
ing,"constitutional adjudication is a qualitative, not quantitative, process, based on iden-
tifying reasons that are permissible bases for government action). Pildes' emphasis on 
"structural" rather than atomistic conceptions of rights corresponds in some ways with 
Canada's more "qualitative" conception of proportionality. 
93. See Coffin, supra note 83, at 22-26. 
94. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 1 (Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982 (being Sched. B to the Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)). 
95. Weinrib, supra note 19, at 17. See also id. at 21 ("Rights guarantees ... do not 
function as absolute counter-majoritarian negations of otherwise plenary state power. 
They intensify the democratic engagement by taking it beyond majority rule at the ballot 
box and in the legislative chamber."). Proportionality analysis, she suggests, produces 
"focused deliberation ... exemplify[ing] the appropriate coordination of judicial and po-
litical functions, both subservient to the constitutional requirement to respect human 
dignity." For an analogous claim about requiring administrative agencies to justify their 
rejection of alternatives, see Lisa Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and 
Legitinuu:y in the Administrative Stare, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 476 (2003) Gustification 
requirement serves "critical role of facilitating participation as well as rationality ... en-
sur[ing] the consideration of party input"). 
96. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 87, at 981. 
97. Compare Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494 (1951), which openly adopted 
Learned Hand's balancing test. The plurality dwelt at length upon the legitimacy of gov-
ernment action to prevent violent overthrow, arguing, for example, that it need not wait 
until a putsch has already occurred, id. at 509, 520-21, but failed fully to consider whether 
the statutory prohibition of "advocacy" risked intruding on areas of protected rights-in 
part because the balancing of interests occurred prior to definition of whether a violation 
of right was entailed. Apart from a quick assertion that the statute does not penalize "dis-
cussion" but only "advocacy," the plurality did not explore the statute's potential harm to 
freedom of speech. By failing to acknowledge the difficulty of distinguishing these two 
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Proportionality, Indeterminacy and Formalism: Notwith-
standing Beatty's arguments, proportionality analysis is unlikely 
to be more determinate, across the board, than other methods of 
constitutional analysis.98 There are some core examples where 
claims of determinacy are persuasive.99 For example, most will 
agree that a sentence of fifty years is more harsh than a sentence 
of ten years, and that the harsher sentence should be reserved 
for an offense, or an offender, who is in some respect "worse."100 
forms of expressive activity, or the chilling effect suppression of the one has on the other, 
the plurality left First Amendment freedoms out in the cold while focusing energy on the 
gravity of the evil the statute sought to prevent. An analysis structured to focus judicial 
attention on the risks to basic rights might induce more caution in the determination of 
the proportional benefit of the challenged practices, reached only after these earlier in-
quiries. 
It is important here to acknowledge that what may matter more to a judge's decision 
than whether she "balances" or engages in proportionality analysis is her underlying 
commitment to the constitutional value at stake, see e.g., supra note 66, or the degree of 
deference given to other constitutional actors' decisions. Cf Rt. Hon. Lord Hoffmann, 
The Influence of the European Principle of Proportionality Upon UK Law, in THE 
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE, supra note 50, at 109-12 
(arguing that the most important question about proportionality is who decides, not its 
internal doctrinal aspects). Justice Frankfurter's Dennis concurrence recognized peti-
tioners' weighty "right to advocate a political theory ... [unless the) advocacy ... cre-
ate(d] an immediate danger of obvious magnitude to the very existence of our present 
scheme of society." Dennis, 341 U.S. at 518-19, 520-21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But 
unlike Justice Douglas, Justice Frankfurter was willing to defer to the legislature rather 
than reach an independent judgment about the dangers posed by the Communist Party. 
See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 587-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Likewise, the principal opinions 
in RJR-Macdonald, discussed supra notes 91-92, disagreed on whether and how strongly 
to defer to Parliament's presumptive determinations of the empirical fact supporting the 
bans on tobacco advertising. Compare RJR-Macdonald, (1995] 3 S.C.R. at 276-79 (La-
Forest, dissenting) (arguing for deference because Parliament was mediating between 
competing group claims rather than acting as a "singular antagonist" of individual} with 
id. at 330-33 (McLachlin, J.) (deference to Parliament does not relieve government of 
burden of demonstrably justifying infringements on free speech rights}. 
98. Beatty's critique of other methods of interpretation as indeterminate across 
some significant range of cases is on the whole compelling. For example, Beatty is par-
ticularly effective in arguing that adoption of broad language itself raises a doubt 
whether the intentions of framers was to limit to original intent (pp. 9-11). Moreover, 
analysis is further complicated if the intentions of any single generation must be read 
through the later intentions of amending generations. See Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic In-
terpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259 
(2001). 
99. As is true for other theories: For example, Professor Ely's representation rein-
forcing political process theory, which Beatty criticizes for its indeterminacy and lack of 
neutrality (p. 24), seems both persuasive and determinate in supporting judicial condem-
nation of gross political malapportionment, like that at issue in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186 (1962). 
100. Within a given legal culture, jurists and lawyers might also agree that a loss of 
parental rights is more severe than loss of a day's vacation. But many comparisons will 
not yield such relatively determinate comparative evaluations. More important, there are 
likely to be fairly wide differences in how intrusions are weighed in the face of asserted 
government interests. So while proportionality may be no more subject to indeterminacy 
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With substantial agreement on this evaluation, one could say, 
some questions of proportionality are quite determinate. But as 
Pam Karlan has recently demonstrated, comparing criminal pun-
ishments is no easy or determinate matter given a metric of pro-
portionality, because of the different ways in which people 
would weigh the severity of the crime against the blameworthi-
ness of the offender. 101 And many of the settings in which pro-
portionality review is invoked involve even more complex 
groupings of interest, issues, means and goals, than is the case in 
criminal punishment. While the choice to focus on the parties' 
"own understandings" might be derived from a clear, principled 
commitment of equal respect for the moral worth of each indi-
vidual, it does not necessarily provide a determinate solution to 
how to "count," weigh, or consider the interests asserted on be-
half of the aggregate of individuals that constitute the "public" 
and those of the burdened individuals or groups that bring a 
challenge.102 
Indeed, for many the question is whether proportionality 
analysis will be more indeterminate, less constraining, on judicial 
decisions than other available interpretive approaches. Case-by-
case application of proportionality analysis, it might be argued, 
virtually invites ad hoc exercises of the judge's own intuitions. 
Strong versions of either interpretive or doctrinal formalism, e.g., 
through intentionalism reinforced by strong stare decisis, or 
through the articulation of categorical rules, might be viewed as 
than other methods of interpretation on plausibly open questions within a legal dis-
course, a positive case has not been made that it is likely to be more determinate and 
predictable a basis for decisionmaking than other methods. 
101. See Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines": The Due Process Clause, Punitive 
Damages, and Capital Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880 (2004). 
102. Beatty's view of the determinacy of proportionality analysis differs markedly 
from other proponents of pragmatic attention to facts and consequences in constitutional 
adjudication. Justice Stephen Breyer, for example, argues that it is "the relevant [consti-
tutional) values" that "constrain subjectivity" by "limiting interpretive possibilities and 
guiding interpretation," as well as the "individual constitutional judge's need for consis-
tency over time." Breyer, supra note 85, at 270. Breyer's claim for determinacy is thus far 
weaker than Beatty's, acknowledging that different judges may reach a range of different 
reasonable conclusions, among the available interpretive possibilities. Judge Richard 
Posner goes even farther, acknowledging that the method of pragmatism may be subject 
to indeterminacy (though possibly no more so than other methods). See Richard Posner, 
Past-Dependency, Pragmatism and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Schol-
arship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 596 (2000); Richard Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1996) [hereafter Pragmatic Adjudication). Posner's response 
to indeterminacy concerns about judges making pragmatic decisions about what is best 
for now and the future, rather than primarily "interpretive" decisions about what is con-
sistent with the past, is to argue that the selection process for federal judges is likely to 
produce "wise elders." !d. at 11-12. 
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desirable because they affirmatively work to suppress the judges' 
own views about the justice or fairness of the situation before 
him or her. On this account, inviting judges to think about the 
benefits of a statute, or how much it intrudes on ordinarily pro-
tected areas, is too broad an invitation to unbridled discretion; to 
direct the judges to determine what category the challenged 
conduct falls into under a "rule,"103 or what precedent is most 
closely on point/04 or what the "original meaning" of particular 
words was, have the advantage, so it is argued, of directing the 
judge away from her intuitions about fairness. 105 Constraints on 
unbridled judicial discretion can arise, however, from disciplined 
resort to the multiple traditional sources of judicial decision, 
within which interpretations that are more consistent with un-
derstandings of constitutional norms (or "values") of fair, non-
arbitrary and consistent treatment ought to control. 106 Con-
103. For a classic expasition of rules and standards in U.S. constitutional law, see 
Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 
27 (1992) ("(R)ules reflect the rationalist and positivist spirit of the codifiers and stan-
dards the pragmatic spirit of the common law judges."). See also, e.g., Louis Kaplow, 
Rules v. Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557 (1992) (associating rules 
with ex ante decisionmaking and standards with ex post decisionmaking, and arguing 
that, due to efficiencies in information gathering and dissemination, rules are more effi-
cient to govern frequently occurring events while standards are preferred for less fre-
quently occurring events); Larry Alexander, Constitutional Rules, Constitutional Stan-
dards, and Constitutional Settlement: Marbury v. Madison and the Case for Judicial 
Supremacy, 20 CoNsr. COMMENT. 369, 374-75 (2003) (distinguishing between parts of the 
Constitution's text that were intended to establish rules, and those intended to establish stan-
dards); cf Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. LAW. 
REV. 303, 312 (arguing that "adaptive behavior" of participants will tend to push rules in 
the direction of standards and to push standards in the direction of rules). 
104. For a sampling from the vast literature on stare decisis and constitutional adju-
dication see, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity and 
Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 2031 (1996); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional 
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 754 (1988); see also Jill E. Fisch, The Implications 
of Transition Theory for Stare Decisis, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 93 (2003). 
105. See e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1185 (1989); Easterbrook, supra note 88, at 781 (in the absence of "'rules' the tug of 
fair treatment is especially strong" and "personal idiosyncrasies or ideologies" may be 
freely indulged). 
106. See generally Richard H. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987); David A. Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). As Fallon notes, especially in 
harder cases "value arguments" are likely to have an important effect in influencing 
judgments as to other sources of decision, including text, intent and precedent. See 
Fallon, supra, at 1194. For Strauss, it is an essential feature of constitutional adjudication 
to reconcile past practice with "evolving moral understandings": "(W)ithin the bounda-
ries set by the text and precedent, judgments of fairness and policy are appropriate." 
Strauss, supra, at 900-01. And as both emphasize, constitutional adjudication's legitimacy 
is grounded in its being constrained, e.g., by text and precedent. See Strauss, supra, at 
900-01; Fallon, supra, at 1265 (referring to the "partial autonomy of constitutional law 
from politics and morals"). 
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straints on judging arise, as well, from the knowledge that deci-
sions once made are precedents in future cases.107 
Jurisprudential commitments to proportionality, moreover, 
may have very complex relationships with particular doctrinal 
approaches. Although Beatty's version of proportionality ap-
pears to entail individualized, case-by-case determinations, the 
questions put by proportionality analysis might also be under-
stood as interpretive tools for the production of (arguably) more 
constraining and categorical rules.108 For Professor Beatty, the 
relevant facts are those concerning the effects of a challenged 
rule on the parties to the case-the interests asserted to be in-
jured by those challenging government action, and the reasons 
for (and strength of reasons for) the government actions. 
Beatty's approach, then, is to treat proportionality as the "stan-
dard" to be applied by courts in evaluating the legality of a chal-
lenged government action. "Standards" are widely regarded as 
somewhat less determinate, at least insofar as lower court appli-
cations, than "rules."109 But proportionality analysis, if focused 
on a broader array of facts and institutional contexts, might lead 
either to the adoption of a more formal rule or a more contextu-
alized standard. 
Beatty also dismisses arguments for judicial "modesty" 
based on deference to other institutions (pp. 156-57), 110 yet their 
existence and responses to judicial rulings make up an important 
107. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571,589 (1987). 
108. Cf David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 
DUKE L.J. 449, 511 n.210 (1994) (referring to "rule utilitarianism, according to which the 
'ultimate justification' of a legal principle lies in its consequences, but under which a 
judge will achieve the best overall consequences by ignoring consideration of conse-
quences and considering only 'the theory and philosophy of law."'). 
109. See Sullivan, supra note 103, at 57-58. 
110. He writes: "The logic of constitutions being the supreme law in a legal system 
means all laws and activities of government must be subject to the same standard of re-
view. No person, nor any law, can be exempt. There is no historical, doctrinal or institu-
tional arrangement that can challenge or override its supremacy .... [P)rinciples that em-
ploy weaker, more deferential tests are premised on a misunderstanding of the way the 
idea of fair shares and the principle of proportionality actually work." (pp. 156-57) In a 
related move, Professor Beatty at times also seems to assume a correspondence between 
judicial rulings and facts on the ground. Thus, for example, he asserts that there is more 
"religious liberty" in Germany than in the United States because he believes that the 
substantive rulings in Germany on religious freedom issues are better than those in the 
United States (p. 52). But statements about the actual condition of human freedom need 
to take into account more than judicial rulings. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books 
and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). And in understanding the condition of 
human freedom, some attention must be given to the way in which court rulings are re-
ceived, understood, and reacted to by private and institutionally distinct public actors 
alike. 
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part of the world of fact in which courts operate. Courts' under-
standings of the severity of a problem, or the need or justifica-
tion for a particular remedy, might be influenced by legislative 
(or, perhaps to a different degree, executive) processes and out-
comes. Likewise, judicial evaluation of the best solution to a 
constitutional problem among those plausibly available might be 
influenced by the expected reactions and the capacities of other 
branches (and levels of courts) and concern for whether those 
will yield a situation closer or further from that consistent with 
the Constitution on the issue at hand. 111 Courts might also be 
concerned with the effects more generally on legislative atten-
tion to constitutional concerns through what Mark Tushnet has 
called "democratic debilitation." 112 And attention to the institu-
tional norms of judicial practice may raise concerns for a single 
minded focus on the proportionalities of particular factual set-
tings to the exclusion of more "interpretive" strategies. 
Consider here the approaches of two U.S. jurists who have 
defended proportionality as a tool of legal analysis. Justice 
Stephen Breyer argues that constitutional interpretation should 
consider what he calls the "real-world consequences of a particu-
lar interpretive decision, valued in terms of basic constitutional 
purposes. "113 Although he endorses "proportionality" as a valu-
able tool for resolving cases in which there are constitutional in-
terest on both sides, his approach differs from Beatty's in begin-
ning with identifying the constitutional values or purposes to be 
derived from the document as a whole and its treatment of pro-
portionality as one tool to be considered in addition to the con-
stitution's "language, history, tradition, and precedent."114 
Breyer also argues for a form of "judicial modesty," of "not be-
ing 'too sure' of oneself," with implications for institutional def-
erence that Beatty rejects. 115 
Ill. See generally Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 
101 MICH. L. REV 885 (2003). 
112. See Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative 
lllumination of the Countermajoritarian Diffrculty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1995). 
113. See Breyer, supra note 85, at 249. 
114. !d. at 253,249. 
115. !d. at 254, 250. Thus Breyer argues that courts should "defer to the legislature's 
own answers insofar as these answers reflect empirical matters about which the legisla-
ture is comparatively expert, for example, the extent of the campaign finance prob-
lem .... ;"the Court should not defer, though, in reviewing claims that "reform legislation 
will defeat the very objective of participatory self-government," for Breyer, one of the 
Constitution's principal values. !d. at 254. His example suggests that institutional defer-
ence is particularly unwarranted where the self-interest of incumbents might lead them to 
ado~t limits designed to insulate themselves from effective challenge, that is, where the 
self-mterest of the legislators is at odds with a capacity for impartial expert factfinding. 
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Judge Richard Posner emphasizes a form of "pragmatism" 
in judging, including the idea that government responses should 
be proportionate, but one that would take account of more gen-
eral social and economic facts apart from those embodying the 
parties' viewpoints. 116 Posner, whose writing suggests a more 
single-minded devotion to pragmatism and consequentialism in 
judging than does Justice Breyer's, nevertheless argues that 
pragmatic concern for consequences may require consideration 
of text, history and precedent.117 For Posner, these traditional 
forms of legal decisionmaking are relevant only to the extent 
that, going forward, resort to those sources makes the most 
sense; the past has no normative claim except to the extent that 
maintaining continuity produces better consequential results for 
the future. For Justice Breyer, the past (text, history, precedent) 
has a normative demand on the present by virtue of judicial 
practice. He incorporates past and present into a more seamless 
web of interpretative practices designed to draw on traditional 
legal sources and an informed understanding of the conse-
quences of different interpretative approaches to implement the 
values immanent in the constitution overall. 
A pragmatic focus on facts, then, may not always require 
case-by-case determinations (or "standards" rather than "rules") 
and may not always exclude concern for precedent and text. A 
judge might conclude that, all things considered, more good-in 
terms of both protection of individual rights and maintaining an 
effective set of governmental institutions-will be produced 
through articulation and application of a categorical rule than a 
more contextualized standard, or through deference to a legisla-
ture than not. For example, a U.S.-style ban on criminal prohibi-
tion of hate speech was defended by dissenting Justices in Can-
ada under an overt standard of proportionality, on the grounds 
that the likely benefits to society of deterring hateful speech 
were relatively small and might, given the possibilities for publi-
cizing those who are prosecuted, be nonexistent, compared with 
the potential for misapplication of such a statute to discourage, 
chill or punish expression deserving protection. 118 
Facts, Social Understandings and Constitutional Change: 
Yet, to suggest that courts should always be open and attentive 
to the concrete factual claims of litigants before them, as Beatty 
116. See Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 102, at 4-8. 
117. Id. at 5. 
118. R. v. Keegstra, [1990]3 S.C.R. 697,848--65 (McLachlin, J. dissenting). 
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does, seems basically right. First, it is easier to know what has 
happened in a single case than to be accurate in making predic-
tions about longer term and farther reaching facts. Institutional 
modesty, especially where statutes are challenged, may be rein-
forced by epistemic modesty about the accurac~ of any body's 
ability to make accurate longer-term predictions. 19 
Second, it is often by exposure to particularized and con-
crete facts that a decisionmaker has capacity to benefit from the 
hypothetically detached and independent power of judging. 
Facts do have a kind of power. Even under categorical rules, as 
social senses of facts shift, lawyers and clients can present claims 
to courts including "irrelevant" facts in order to test the limits of 
and in some cases to change the scope of categorical rules and 
make relevant what was formerly invisible or irrelevant. 12° Facts 
(or rather, our confrontations and engagements with them) may 
open eyes to how concepts like liberty or equality should be un-
derstood to apply, or reveal that forms of behavior once ac-
cepted as "natural" are in fact discriminatory. A common law 
process of constitutional adjudication can "interpenetrate(] law 
with society in both directions, cohering changing social stan-
dards and shaping precedents that exist into new law in response 
to new or newly perceived facts." 121 Willingness to hear and con-
sider facts can open the mind to different understandings, unset-
tle long held beliefs, or reveal unconscious (and incorrect) as-
sumptions about the world. For all these reasons, attentiveness 
to facts can improve constitutional adjudication. 
Attention to facts is important-and attention to major 
changes in the way social facts are understood is virtually inevi-
table. But this importance cannot be grounded on a claim of ob-
jectivity, given the mutability of our understandings of facts, but 
rather on the relationships of facts to meaning, and the impor-
119. For a classic discussion of the benefits of judicial "minimalism," see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 32,43 (1996) (not-
ing possibility of error and limits on information as among the concerns that underlie 
both the rules-standards debate and judicial-minimalism-maximalism discussion.). 
120. For recent discussions of the complexity and interpendence of human reasoning 
about facts and law, see, e.g., Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Co-
herence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 516 (2004) (arguing from re-
search in cognitive psychology that "decisions are the product of a cognitive mechanism 
that operates bidirectionally", under the influence of a strong disposition for coherent 
mental models, such that premises influence understandings of facts and facts influence 
premises); Donald Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1569, 1595-96 (2000). 
121. Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections on the Devel-
opment of Sexual Harassment Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813, 814 (2002). 
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tance of more rather than less inclusive understandings of facts 
from the perspectives of those who are subject to the court's de-
cisions. Law or legal values help us to understand what facts 
mean, at least as much as facts help us to understand what the 
law should be.122 And as judges begin to respond that the appli-
cation of law to facts is disproportionate, this both signals and 
contributes to understandings that legal norms may be and need 
to be shifting. Proportionality review focused on the facts of par-
ticular litigant situations thus helps provide a needed degree of 
flexibility to constitutional interpretation over time. 123 
IV. PROPORTIONALITY IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: SOME TENTATIVE THOUGHTS 
Although Beatty asserts proportionality to be the true basis 
of all constitutional decisionmaking, running to "all four comers 
of every constitutional text" (p. 163),124 proportionality analysis 
is not a constitutional tool of universal meaning or significance. 
The practices of constitutional adjudication are in fact far more 
complex, with areas in which interpretivism's focus on text, or 
the existence of well-established precedent, cannot be ignored in 
the name of proportionality without affecting, and perhaps un-
dermining, the legitimacy of judicial review as a legal institution. 
Proportionality is more likely to be a helpful question on some 
issues (for example, what is cruel and unusual punishment),125 
122. See Simon, supra note 120, at 536-37 (describing how strong facts can cause 
"coherence shifts"); id. at 583 ("Decisions and inferences do not conform to models of 
rationalism inspired by logical forms of inference making, nor are they based on con-
sciously disingenuous, biased, or backward reasoning. Complex decisions are solved 
rather by nuanced cognitive processes that progress bidirectionally between premises and 
facts on the one hand, and conclusions on the other."). For an interesting defense of judi-
cial review of proportionality as a helpful form of "policy evaluation," see Engel, supra 
note 70, at 285-314 (arguing that constitutional proportionality review provides helpful 
assessment of policies because courts are disinterested and review legislation after it is 
implemented; courts are good at "detecting unexpected outcomes and atypical cases" 
since the court deals mainly with individual cases; and knowing this, individuals have 
strong incentives to bring cases before the court which can facilitate their assessment 
role). 
123. See also Fallon, supra note 106, at 1262-Q7 (considerations of value will influ-
ence understandings of other sources and are necessary to "shap[e] constitutional doc-
trine to the exigencies of changing times"). 
124. Most examples in this book are of individual or group-based rights, asserted 
under broad and general constitutional language, rather than structural issues of gov-
ernment organization. In his earlier book Professor Beatty articulated a theory of pro-
portionality in the Canadian federalism cases. See BEAlTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, su-
pra note 3, at 25-QO. 
125. Cf De Burca, supra note 50, at 136 (noting greater willingness of European 
Court of Justice to apply aggressive forms of proportionality review of punishments, for-
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than on others (for example, whether each state must have two 
Senators, or whether a grand jury indictment must precede a 
federal criminal prosecution). As these examples are intended to 
suggest, proportionality may have little or no role on constitu-
tional issues generally regarded within the legal community as 
resolved by constitutional text itself. 126 The greater the clarity 
and singularity of the constitutional text, the less room most 
courts would allow for applying the concept of proportionality. 
The "best practices" method Beatty argues for is likely to be 
less effective in the analysis of structural constitutional questions 
than as a tool for the analysis of individual rights. Proportional-
ity analysis based on the perspectives of the parties has more 
limited application to structural issues of federalism, for reasons 
related to the limitations of concrete judicial review as exists in 
the United States. Moreover, there are important rule of 
law/separation of powers principles designed to require legisla-
tive decisionmaking on difficult issues, to which proportionality 
concerns are at best only a factor. Finally, proportionality as an 
analytical tool in Beatty's sense may have less to offer in more 
well-settled areas of constitutional law, and more to offer with 
respect to some claims of right than others. A more institution-
ally-oriented version of proportionality analysis might distin-
guish between those rights that are derogable, based on propor-
tionality analysis in a more specific context, and those which 
should be regarded as nonderogable. 
Federalism: Some aspects of federal systems may involve 
very specific compromises on which national commitments to 
union are deemed to rest. For example, in the United States the 
two Senators-per-state rule reflects a seemingly clear decision to 
impose a specific rule, one that might be regarded as wildly in-
consistent with norms of proportionality and equality. Unless 
one is prepared to argue that the clarity of the constitutional text 
feitures and the like: "Deciding on the proportionality of penal measures is a task which 
is generally accepted as an appropriate one for the judicial process, since it does not usu-
ally involve a discretionary choice amongst alternative policy options, but rather an indi-
vidual decision in a particular set of circumstances."). 
126. More generally, one might say, proportionality analysis may be more useful in 
those cases seen as "hard" than those seen as relatively easy, for what makes a case 
"easy" has to do with shared understandings of what has already been settled by text, 
meanings developed through political activity, by convention or judicial decision-all of 
which may elide any need to resort to weighing, balancing or proportionality. I do not 
think Beatty would disagree with this characterization, nor do I mean to suggest that the 
categories of hard, easy, or settled are themselves fixed. Cf Mark Tushnet, Constitutional 
Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004) (describing ways of challenging settled 
constitutional understandings). 
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must yield to later constitutional commitments,127 it is difficult to 
see any role for proportionality. The founding compromises of 
federal systems, to the extent that they are emblazoned with 
clarity in constitutional text and confirmed by decades of prac-
tice, simply may not yield to any interpretive moves including 
arguments- before courts-based on proportionality. 128 
This is not to deny any role for some versions of propor-
tionality in analyzing federalism questions. In Beatty's earlier 
work on Canadian federalism, "proportionality" meant a form of 
review of the reasonableness of federal legislation in not intrud-
ing "too far" into the realm of provincial authority, in an effort 
to sustain as much as possible the concurrent capacities of both 
levels of government, provincial and federal. 129 The proportion-
ality of a measure to its purported purpose may be useful in ana-
lyzing federalism questions even without a judicial commitment 
to maximizing concurrent powers. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decisions in Morrison and Lopez advanced a more cate-
gorical (non-concurrent) approach to defining federal and state 
power at the same time as the Court articulated a test of propor-
tionality as a measure of congressional power under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in Boerne v. Flores. 130 Rule of law 
concerns (notwithstanding Professor Beatty's a-textual concep-
tion of judicial review), call for some connection between gov-
ernment action and a legal source of authority. Where the means 
chosen are grossly disproportionate to the asserted goal, the dis-
proportion may justify a finding that the measure is beyond the 
scope of national power.131 
127. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (treating Fourteenth Amendment 
as a sub silentio modification of the Eleventh Amendment). 
128. Of course, it might be suggested, such issues are generally not brought to court, 
but related questions may be. See, e.g., Adler v. Ontario, [1996]3 S.C.R. 609 (S. Ct. Can-
ada) (challenge, to province's failure to provide support for private schools for Jewish 
children, rejected, because founding compromise in Section 93 of 1867 Constitution Act 
was limited to the Catholic and Protestant denominational schools as then existed). 
129. BEATIY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 25-27. 
130. 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, 
Gender and the Globe, 111 YALE L. J. 619 (2001). If one conceives of state governments 
as "rights holders" vis-a-vis the federal government, one could apply some version of 
proportionality analysis analogous to that applied for individual rights claims. See Jack-
son, Ambivalent Resistance, supra note 80, at 626-27. But governmental powers can be 
concurrent or exclusive, subject to preemption or not, in ways that do not correspond 
closely to individual rights secured by bills of rights. 
131. Proportionality review can be applied with greater and lesser degrees of rigor; 
history suggests that in the United States nondeferential review of the proportionality of 
national means would fail to allow adequate scope to the role of Congress. See Jackson, 
Ambivalent Resistance, supra note 80, at 630-32 (arguing that proportionality review 
should be applied with a high degree of deference to national legislation in evaluating 
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But proportionality under Beatty's approach in this new 
book will have more utility for constitutional analysis of individ-
ual rights issues than on structural issues of constitutionalism. 
His emphasis on the need to focus on "the perspectives of those 
who are most affected by whatever law or government action is 
under review" as parties before the court, may do less well in 
capturing the longer term structural interests that divisions of 
government powers are designed to advance than in capturing 
unfair burdens imposed on particular individuals. In cases such 
as Lopez, or Morrison, involving federalism-based challenges to 
national legislation, whether one's conduct is being regulated by 
a state or federal government is not likely to make that much of 
a difference to the private entity or person who challenges the 
law, even though they have a litigation interest in defeating the 
claim to power of the government under whose criminal statute 
they are prosecuted. And although governments may be able to 
participate in litigation through amicus filings, there are signifi-
cant difficulties in relying on such measures-typically under the 
control of a handful of executive branch la~ers- for a stable 
account of a state government's "interest."132 The constitutional 
interests at stake in federalism questions system may be thus, at 
least in some sense, not fully represented in litigation before a 
court. 
Presidential/executive powers: On structural issues of separa-
tion of powers, proportionality analysis based on the interests ar-
ticulated by the parties before the court may also have a rela-
Section 5 exercise of power). 
132. States' capacities to develop and articulate the long-range interests of their gov-
ernments in litigation may not be as well developed as that of the central government 
which, in the United States, is represented by the Solicitor General's office and its tradi-
tion of high quality lawyering that seeks to maintain some continuity of position on be-
half of the federal government with some independence from the partisan positions of 
particular Administrations. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR 
GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987). Perhaps for this reason, as well as the obvious 
potential for conflicting positions among the states on federalism issues, courts may be 
more willing to reject state governments' characterizations of their own interests in fed-
eralism cases. Consider Morrison, where thirty-six states and the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico argued in favor of VA W A's constitutionality and only one state argued 
against it, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 654 {2000) (Souter, J. dissenting). 
Moreover, although both individual and governmental interests change over time, an 
individual litigant may be regarded as more likely to have a continuity of interests in the 
arguments made-or may be more justifiably regarded as accurately representing his or 
her own interests at the time they are made-than are particular members of executive 
branches (who are the litigators) of state governments. For related questions whether 
particular litigants asserting individual rights claims can adequately represent the inter-
ests that ought to be considered by a court that believes it is weighing factors for a bal-
ance, see Aleinikoff, supra note 87, at 978--79. 
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tively smaller role to play, in part for reasons already discussed 
about the possible disconnect between that methodology and 
proper resolution of structural questions. 133 But there are impor-
tant distinctions from a constitutional point of view between 
challenges to executive and challenges to legislative action that 
Beatty's proportionality analysis would seemingly ignore (or 
dispute). 
Executives or governments may be found to lack constitu-
tional authority to take action without legislative authoriza-
tion.134 It may serve both democracy and basic rule of law pur-
poses to require legislative authorization before action is taken, 
especially action that trenches on liberty. The U.S. Constitu-
tion's insistence on the role of law and its implication that fed-
eral law is made by Congress provide a constitutional basis for 
such a requirement. 135 As Professor Lorraine Weinrib has ar-
gued her vision of post-World War II constitutionalism: 
Postwar rights-protecting constitutions do not. . . authorize 
the judiciary to treat rights as absolute negations of otherwise 
plenary state authority. Nor do they simply transfer to the 
courts the political power or prerogatives of elected represen-
tatives. They presuppose limited government with separation 
133. To the extent proportionality analysis is legitimated by its relation to the narra-
tives of the parties, the constitutional interests in separating legislative and executive 
powers may not be well represented where private individuals or entities challenge laws 
or executive action. Consider Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (rejecting 
the constitutionality of a line item veto). It is hard to know how an analysis of propor-
tionality would be applied in any helpful way to understand the constitutional question 
there: identifying the actually injured parties in any concrete case will vary enormously 
depending on what the legislation is and what the vetoed portion is, and yet surely these 
should not be dispositive, since the constitutional questions affect a wider range of insti-
tutional and structural relationships. Cf David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The 
Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 808, 809-13, 854-55 (2004) (noting disjuncture between standing requirements 
based on personal injury and abstract formalist reasoning in separation of powers cases 
as in the line item veto case). 
134. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Cf 
United States v. Watkins, 354 U.S. 178,205-06 (1957) (reversing conviction for contempt 
of Congress where authorization of committee inquiry was insufficiently clear). 
135. One of the significant changes from the Articles of Confederation to the Consti-
tution was the latter's insistence on the role of "law". See, e.g., U.S. CoNST., Art. I, §8 
(Congress's power to make "all Laws" necessary and proper to carry out national gov-
ernment powers); Art. I, §9 (no money to be drawn from treasury except "in conse-
quence of appropriations made by Law"); Art. II, §3 (President to "take care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed"); Art. III, §2 (jurisdiction over "all cases" arising under "the 
Laws of the United States"); Art. VI (Constitution and "the Laws of the United States" 
made in pursuance thereof are declared "the supreme Law of the Land"); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. III (providing that derogations during war time from the usual rule-that 
"no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house" -can only occur "in a man-
ner to be prescribed by law"). 
2004] BOOK REVIEWS 
of powers that maximizes the complementary institutional 
strengths of legislatures, the executive and the courts. Elected 
representative bodies continue to act as responsible policy-
makers, both empowered and disciplined by the constitutional 
instrument. The executive acts in compliance with the rule of 
I 136 aw. 
847 
For Weinrib, the first part of "justification" under proportional-
ity analysis is to show that the challenged action has been au-
thorized by enacted law. "In most instances the legality stricture 
requires the state to have authorized the encroachment through 
the regular channels of law-making, so that it is the product of a 
representative, accountable, deliberative public process and em-
bodied in an accessible and intelligible legal instrument." 137 
Without benefit of this kind of lawmaking process it is more dif-
ficult for courts to evaluate governmental claims of the necessitl 
or appropriateness of actions that infringe on protected rights. 13 
Thus, proportionality in Beatty's terms is a principle that 
might come into play after a prior constitutional determination 
of whether challenged government action is authorized by law. 
Granted, courts may be more inclined to find executive action to 
be ultra vires when it ap~ears to impose disproportionate or oth-
erwise suspect burdens.1 9 But it devalues the role of legislatures 
in informing our understanding of and making decisions about 
how to balance public need with individual privation to suggest 
that legislative authorization of executive action is irrelevant to 
analysis of constitutionality. 
Proportionality's Value; Two Kinds of Rights? Nonetheless, 
Beatty's large point-that the concept of "proportionality" is a 
basic, useful trope of judicial reasoning in challenges to govern-
136. Weinrib, supra note 19, at 16-17. 
137. /d. at 17. Cf Bressman, supra note 95, at 494, 499-500 (arguing that separation 
of powers should be understood as protP.ction against arbitrary government action). 
138. Cf Watkins, 354 U.S. at 205-06 ("Protected freedoms should not be placed in 
danger ... [absent] a clear determination by the House or the Senate that a particular 
inquiry is justified by a specific legislative need .... An excessively broad charter ... 
places the courts in an untenable position if they are to strike a balance between the pub-
lic need for a particular interrogation and the right of citizens to carry on their affairs free 
from unnecessary governmental interference."). 
139. See, e.g., Public Comm. Against Torture v. State of Israel, HCJ 5100/94, 'I 39 
(Sup. Ct. Isr. 1999), available aJ Supreme Court of Israel Website, http://elyonl.court. 
gov.iUfiles_eng/94/000/051/a09/94051000.a09.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2005) (holding use 
use of torture by investigators to be unlawful, at least absent very explicit legislative au-
thorization, stating "Whether it is appropriate for Israel, in light of its security difficulties, 
to ~anction physical means is an issue that must be decided by the legislative branch, 
which represents the people. We do not take any stand on this matter at this time."). 
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ment action-seems unassailable. This is not to say that in every 
case it will be helpful; in well-established areas under older con-
stitutions, such as some aspects of U.S. First Amendment law, 
proportionality may have little role to play. The practice of judi-
cial review is to some extent self-legitimating, and part of its self-
legitimation lies in the constraints of actin& in a manner consis-
tent with existing interpretive practices. 0 Thus, interpretive 
theory that calls on judges to widely depart from accepted norms 
of interpretation and its sources-including text and precedent-
risks undermining its legitimacy. But in some areas of constitu-
tional law current doctrine approximates forms of proportional-
ity analysis. 141 Proportionality's reference points may well be dif-
ferent in analyzing claims of individual right and claims involving 
structural allocations of powers, and its valence differs among 
individual rights in how it is deployed. 142 But its utility and le-
gitimacy in many areas seems beyond question. General lan-
guage only takes a constitutional court so far; new issues and 
changing understandings of the meaning of basic constitutional 
values can often be worked out more systematically through the 
structure of questions that proportionality analysis asks, espe-
cially to the extent that one of the tasks of constitutional law is 
to prevent unfair treatment of individuals or groups by govern-
ments. 
140. See Fallon, supra note 106, at 1233 (constitutional theory as mix of descriptive 
and normative components); cf. Richard Fallon, How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 
87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 544 (1999) ("[E)ven the most paradigmatically practice-based the-
ory must acknowledge that American constitutional practice has a text at its center."). 
Constitutional theories are widely thought to require some degree of fit with existing 
"points of agreement ... that are absolutely rock solid," like the correctness of Brown v. 
Board of Education, David A. Strauss, What is Constitutional Theory?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 
581,583--84 (1999), and Beatty has suggested that interpretive methods also require some 
degree of fit with existing practice (pp. 33-35). 
141. See supra note 80. 
142. In addition to proportionality's use in Boerne and its progeny to constrain na-
tional power under the Fourteenth Amendment, "rough proportionality" has been used 
in U.S. law to help define land use regulations that will be treated as regulatory "takings" 
entitling the property owner to compensation and thereby to limit the powers of state 
and local governments. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Commen-
tary has focused on the danger of "Lochner-izing" judicial review of regulation through 
"rough proportionality" and its emphasis on what one scholar calls "consequential fit". 
Barton H. Thompson, The Allure of Consequential Fit, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1261 (2000); see 
also Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive 
Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158 (2002). The debate over these developme~ts, li~e 
that over the proportionality test of Boerne v. Flores, points up that proportiOnality 
analysis is a method of review that can lead in very different policy directions, depending 
on what values are used as the baseline against which proportionality is conducted and 
the degree of strictness with which the standard of proportionality is applied. 
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Proportionality analysis as Beatty envisions it implies that 
rights are not absolute trumps protecting an arena of individual 
conduct from obstruction by regulation, but only interests, some 
stronger than others, which can be overcome provided the justi-
fication offered is sufficiently compelling.143 This may be a sensi-
ble way to understand what many rights mean. Rights to equality 
cannot meaningfully be defined, as noted earlier, without deci-
sions about what kinds of differences in treatment based on what 
kinds of criteria and for what kinds of purposes are justifiable.144 
The due process clause recognizes that important interests- in 
liberty, in property, arguably in life itself-may be limited, pro-
vided proper process and/or substantive justification is present. 
The Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of the "reasonable-
ness" of a search, a term that virtually invites inquiry into there-
lationship, or fit, between the government's legitimate interests 
and the citizen's interests in privacy, as well as between the ob-
ject of the search and its scope.145 The ban on "cruel" punish-
143. As a formal matter in the United States a constitutional "right" is not "over-
come," but its content may be narrowed or defined by reference to the government in-
terest in regulation; in Canada, the "right" is recognized as being infringed but the in-
fringement may be constitutional if sufficiently and properly justified. The differences 
between these two kinds of analytics may be of practical significance in doing propor-
tionality analysis. Proportionality analysis requires a clear articulation of what the consti-
tutionally protected right claimed to be violated is, a clarity that may be submerged in an 
analysis that melds the question of right with that of justification. See supra note 97 (dis-
cussing Dennis). 
144. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 
(1982). 
145. In Lago v. Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) the Court rejected the argument that 
the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless arrests for minor offenses punishable only 
by fines. Yet the majority agreed that, on the facts, the government conduct-arresting 
the parent-driver of young children for a first-time seat belt offense punishable by a $50 
fine-was unjustifiable. See 532 U.S. at 346-47 ("In her case, the physical incidents of 
arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) 
exercising extremely poor judgment. Atwater's claim to live free of pointless indignity 
and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against it specific to her 
case."). But, the Court concluded, the "Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by 
standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest every 
discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for constitutional re-
view." /d. This concern for the administrability of a rule against warrantless arrests for 
nonjai1able offenses may be of a piece with the more general phenomenon that Professor 
Stuntz has criticized: the absence of proportionality between investigative methods regu-
lated under the Fourth Amendment and the seriousness of the crime involved. See Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 865 (2001). Had the Court relied on a more structured propor-
tionality analysis, it would not have stopped with identifying the possible adverse effects 
on policing of allowing such claims but would have inquired also as to the benefits to ef-
fective policing in a democracy from adhering to such a rule and would have considered 
not only the "pointless indignity" imposed on the complainant (and the relatively small 
number of others who suffered similar arrests), but the harm that knowledge of such po-
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ments, or "excessive" fines, by their language might seem to de-
mand inquiry into proportionality.146 
Yet there may be some individual rights-for example, 
against being assassinated by the government, against being 
prosecuted for mere beliefs (e.g., in the existence or nonexis-
tence of a deity), or against being tortured-that we would want 
categorized as nonderogable rights. One might take this position 
for intentionalist reasons, or for ontological reasons, but one 
might also take this approach for more instrumental reasons. If 
one measure of a successful constitutional theory is its capacity 
to promote protection of individual rights, a pragmatic, conse-
quentialist approach, designed to identify the most "propor-
tional" or fitting method of interpretation for the protection of 
particular constitutional values or interests, 147 might itself yield 
the conclusion that some rights should be presumed to be 
"trumps" as against government action.148 Categorical rules 
against torture, or against prior restraints on speech, may in par-
ticular cases seem grossly disproportional, if great harm seem-
ingly could be avoided through breach of the rule. But to the ex-
tent that proportionality analysis directs our attention to the 
relationship between means and end-here, between a court's 
interpretive position and the desired constitutional goal-a court 
might decide to eschew case-by-case analyses of proportionality 
in favor of rigidly uncontextualized rules, designed to protect 
commitments that would be unusually fragile to the foreseeable 
lice power may impose on others in a democratic society, whether or not they are actu-
ally subject to the same "indignities." 
146. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Beatty's powerful arguments that proportionality is a 
necessary attribute of a rule of law system that reconciles individual and community in-
terests would support more rigorous review of the proportionality of criminal sentences 
in the United States. That proportionality doctrine has been applied to control punitive 
damages in civil litigation, but not to the length of criminal sentences, is hard to under-
stand, given that the Due Process Clause applies to both. But cf Karlan, supra note 101, 
at 914-15, 919-20 (suggesting that availability of checks on criminal convictions-
including the requirements of public initiation of suit, proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
and the presence of statutory maximums-might be thought to diminish the need for 
proportionality review). 
147. I use the term proportionality here, not in the way Prof. Beatty does, as an ap-
proach to be applied by courts to resolve specific cases on their facts, but rather to refer 
to the fit between interpretive method and the goals of constitutional protections. 
148. I assume for purposes of this essay that one can think of rights within one sys-
tem either as absolute protections of defined behavior or status or as rights to not be 
treated in a certain way except with proper justification by the government. For helpful 
discussions of these differing ways of understanding rights or protected interests, see 
Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REv. 415 (1993); 
Richard H Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 
343 (1993); see also sources cited supra note 16. 
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effects of errors in the application of proportionality analysis on 
a case-by-case basis.149 
Whether to view constitutional challenges as better resolved 
by categorical rules, institutional presumptions, or more contex-
tualized case-by-case analysis under some form of proportional-
ity standard is an inquiry that may itself be informed by prag-
matic consideration of the consequences of different approaches 
and of the relationship between the means (that is, here, the in-
terpretive method) and the end (protection of constitutional val-
ues and individual rights ). 150 But trying to determine whether a 
particular interpretive approach is best designed, over the long 
run, to promote realization of constitutional values can be quite 
difficult, lSI for reasons illustrated by the U.S. Court's most recent 
application of a balancing approach to procedural due process 
issues, in the context of the constitutionality of executive deten-
tion of "enemy combatants." 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 152 the Court upheld detention of U.S. 
citizens in the United States as enemy combatants, provided that 
detainees had a meaningful opportunity before an impartial tri-
bunal to contest that designation. The holding was, on the one 
hand, a significant rejection of a claim of essentially unlimited 
executive power to detain based on "some evidence," not subject 
to refutation, and for a wide range of purposes, including inter-
149. See also Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 543 (1988) ("[W)e 
must ... decide the extent to which we are willing to disable good decisionmakers in or-
der to simultaneously to disable bad ones."). 
150. The idea that a concern to produce proportionate results might support either 
ex post case-by-case evaluation or ex ante rules has some parallels to the debate over 
rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism. Cf Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 111, at 924 
("The choice between interpretive formalism and antiformalism has some of the same 
intellectual structure as the choice between rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism."). 
For an introduction to the debate, see BRAD HOOKER, IDEAL CODE, REAL WORLD: A 
RULE-CONSEQUENTIALIST niEORY OF MORALITY {2.(XX)); CONRAD D. JOHNSON, MORAL 
LEGISLATION: A LEGAL-POUriCAL MODEL FOR INDIRECT CONSEQUENTIALIST REAsoNING 
(1991); JJ.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in JJ.C. SMART & BERNARD 
Wll.LIAMS UTn..ITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 9-12 {1973); see also John Rawls, Two Con-
cepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3 (1955) (distinguishing between rules about acts and rules 
about practices). 
151. Professor Fallon has argued that a constitutional theory should be measured by 
the degree to which it protects the rule of law, a set of substantive rights, and fair oppor-
tunities for democratic decisionmaking. See Fallon, supra note 140, at 568-70. In making 
this judgment, he has controversially suggested, one might consider such historically con-
tingent factors as who the judges are in any given period. /d. Without some historically 
specific analysis, it may be difficult to make the instrumental assessment of what method 
of interpretation will yield interpretations that will best protect individual rights-a ques-
tion that requires scrutiny not only of the interpretive decisions but of how they will be 
received and implemented by other courts and actors within the system. 
152. 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004). 
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rogation. 153 The various opinions read together make clear that a 
detainee who contests the designation must have a hearing be-
fore a neutral decisionmaker with an opportunity to rebut the 
government's determination through evidence and with the as-
sistance of counsel. 154 The plurality opinion by Justice 
O'Connor155 relied on a form of balancing developed in Mathews 
v. Eldridge156 to decide what procedures were due in light of the 
detainee's interest in not being wrongfully detained and the gov-
ernment's interest in not disrupting national security or military 
operations by pulling personnel from the field to provide live 
testimony to meet a burden of proof. It sought to design a pro-
cedural approach that was proportional-that is, that would pro-
tect against erroneous designations and their severe conse-
quences for individual liberty by providing a meaningful hearing 
before an impartial decisionmaker, while not imposing undue 
burdens on the government's ability to prosecute war. 157 
In so doing, however, the Court also upheld a substantial 
authority in the Executive to designate citizens as enemy com-
batants and hold them for the duration of hostilities. 158 In thus 
approving an extension of executive authority to detain citizens 
in the United States-outside of the ordinary criminal justice 
153. The Court also held that where a citizen is captured on the battlefield and de-
tained as an enemy combatant, indefinite detention was authorized because of the need 
to prevent such enemy combatants from rejoining the battle, but not for the purpose of 
interrogation (as the government had argued). See id. at 2641-42 (O'Connor, J., for the 
plurality). 
154. The Court on this point consisted of Justice O'Connor's plurality for four, 
joined by Justice Souter writing for himself and Justice Ginsburg. 
155. The plurality was joined by Justice Breyer (a proponent of consequentialist con-
cerns, including for proportionality, in his academic writing). See Breyer, supra note 85, 
at 253. 
156. 424 u.s. 319,334-35 (1976). 
157. See e.g., Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2649 (in light of "uncommon potential to burden" 
the military from full dress hearings, hearsay evidence could be admitted and a presump-
tion in favor of the government could be used). The plurality opinion considered the par-
ties' "narratives," in Beatty's sense: it acknowledged the important interests of a citizen 
in not being wrongfully detained as an enemy combatant by good faith mistake, i.e., when 
they were in a war zone for journalism, tourism, or humanitarian purposes, see id. at 
2649, or in bad faith (e.g., through abuse of power to detain for political ends). See id. at 
2647 (noting that "an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a 
means for oppression and abuse"). It recognized the government's interest in preventing 
those who had fought against it in time of war, whether citizen or not, from returning to 
the field of battle. It thus identified both the liberty interest of the citizen and the gov-
ernment's interest in detaining bona fide enemy combatants as important and legitimate, 
and concluded that some meaningful hearing for citizens who contest their designation 
was required. See id. at 2646-49. 
158. The five justice majority on this point consisted of Justice Thomas, who be-
lieved that no process was required other than the presidential decision to detain, and 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the four-justice plurality. 
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process and outside of the system of military justice- the Court's 
decision in Hamdi may come to stand as much for its recognition 
of an expanded presidential authority as it does for the proposi-
tion that the claimed authority is subject to judicial review. 159 
Hamdi was a significant affirmation of executive authority to de-
tain, without charge or trial, U.S. citizens in the U.S., on a mili-
tary determination that, while subject to judicial review, is likely 
to be difficult to overcome and which may result in indefinite 
and lengthy periods of detention. 
The plurality opinion did not purport to rely on any form of 
proportionality analysis in concluding that the President had 
power to detain,160 but considered the proportionalities only in 
deciding what process is due in the hearings it held were re-
quired in contested cases. But did the availability of a made-to-
measure, "proportional" hearing facilitate upholding the execu-
tive power to detain? Would all members of the O'Connor plu-
rality have upheld the detention power were it not for the avail-
ability of the truncated due process protections prescribed?161 
Four other justices would have found the President to lack 
authority to detain. Resting principally on institutional concerns 
('representation-reinforcement'), Justice Souter, joined by Jus-
tice Ginsburg, concluded that clearer language was required to 
authorize such presidential designations given the liberty interest 
involved.162 Acknowledging that difficult balances must be 
159. Compare United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (rejecting the President's 
claim of immunity from subpoena of presidential tape recordings). Although the Nixon 
case was hailed at the time as a great victory for the rule of law in checking a potentially 
abusive presidency, over the years since it has been of signal importance for its recogni-
tion of a constitutional basis for Presidential claims of immunity from compelled disclo-
sure of information, notwithstanding the absence of a text in Article II paralleling the 
Speech and Debate Clause immunity for Members of Congress. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-55 (1982); Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 
U.S. 440,485 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Cheney v. United States 
District Court, 124 S. a. 2576, 2588 (2004). 
160. The plurality found that the President had been given statutory authority to 
detain enemy combatants in accordance with the laws of war and, relying in part on Ex 
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), that nothing precluded citizens from being so treated. 
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-44 (O'Connor, J., for the plurality). 
161. It is also possible that, had a Mathews v. Eldridge analysis been unavailable-
had members of the plurality believed that the choices were full criminal trial, release, or 
acceptance of the government claim that no further judicial process was due-given the 
high stakes of military operations, one or more of these justices might have concluded 
that no process was due, rather than direct the prisoner's release or subject the govern-
ment to criminal trial type procedures. The point here is the difficulty of assessing, em-
pirically, the relationships between proportionality-like tests as a tool of analysis and par-
ticular, concrete outcomes. 
162. 124 S. Ct. at 2652 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concur-
ring in the judgment). On "representation-reinforcement," see GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET 
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struck between liberty and security in wartime, he argued that 
the legislative branch was the appropriate body to strike that 
balance in the first instance. 163 He thus deployed a form of repre-
sentation-reinforcing, constitutional ultra vires argument to pro-
tect liberty absent legislatively authorized intrusions, 164 without 
significant resort to balancing or proportionality. Taking a more 
"interpretive" and categorical approach, Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justice Stevens, concluded that the Constitution had addressed 
the question of emergencies and of traitorous activity by citizens 
against the United States, and allowed only two possibilities.165 
Either the government could bring criminal charges against 
Hamdi or others associated with the enemy, subject to criminal 
trial in an Article III court as contemplated by Article III's Trea-
son clause, or Congress could act to "suspend the writ" of habeas 
corpus (perhaps subject to conditions like those prescribed by 
the Court). Unless government action fell within one of these 
two categories, liberty was to be preserved.166 Again, no balanc-
ing of proportionalities was called for. 
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61, 73-74 (5th ed. 2005); see also JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
163. !d. at 2653-55 (relying on prior statute prohibiting detention of U.S. citizens 
without explicit authority and on need to protect liberty from executive branch depreda· 
tions). Justice Souter also acknowledged that "in a moment of genuine emergency" with-
out time for deliberation the Executive could detain a citizen feared to be an imminent 
threat for a short time. See id. at 2659. One might see Souter, then, as employing a more 
complex interpretive strategy, in which executive power to detain is ordinarily prohibited 
absent legislative authorization for institutional reasons, but in which a "true" emergency 
might make unauthorized executive detention a proportionate and constitutional re-
sponse. 
164. Had the issue been remanded to Congress, it is, of course, possible that the 
Congress would have authorized detentions on terms more draconian than the Court. 
Given experience in other western democracies, there is at least some reason to believe 
that legislative bodies would provide for time limits on detention, access to counsel and 
judicial review. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Comparative Law Scholars and Experts on 
the Laws of the United Kingdom and Israel in Support of Respondent, Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027), :!004 U.S. S. a. Briefs LEXIS 298 [hereaf-
ter Brief of Comparative Law Scholars). See also Hamdi, 124 S.a. at 2659 (Souter, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (referring to USA Patriot Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(5), im-
posing time limits on detention without charge of suspected alien terrorists and stating: 
"It is very difficult to believe that the same Congress that carefully circumscribed Execu-
tive power over alien terrorists on home soil would not have meant to require the Gov-
ernment to justify clearly its detention of an American citizen held on home soil incom-
municado"); 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(7) (with respect to aliens certified for removal, 
certification is reviewable every 6 months). 
165. Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
166. See Hamdi, 124 s.a. at 266(}..{i1 (Scalia, J., )("The very core of liberty secured 
by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite im-
prisonment at the will of the Executive.") 
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Which interpretive approach would we associate with the 
most "proportional" set of responses to this and similar legal 
controversies? Notwithstanding Beatty's apparent rejection of 
considerations of institutional role in deferring to legislative or 
executive determinations, 167 his argument would surely not pre-
clude reliance on ultra vires doctrines as a first approach to ex-
ecutive threats to fundamental freedoms. In a number of western 
democracies, detailed provisions authorizing detention of terror-
ists had been enacted by legislatures. 168 From the perspective of 
developing constitutional law that accords with norms of propor-
tionality in protecting constitutionally defined human rights, how 
should one determine which approach is likely to yield better an-
swers where a chief executive has already acted to effect sei-
zures-one in which the Court assumes the responsibility for de-
signing procedures to permit such detentions to continue or 
remands the issue to the legislature for its determination? Surely 
the Court is correct that basic commitments of due process re-
quire that if the executive wants to hold a U.S. citizen on a claim 
that he is an enemy combatant, the detainee should have a 
meaningful opportunity to contest the facts underlying the des-
ignation. But whether the President should have been deemed to 
have authority to detain on so unspecific an authorization as that 
provided by the Authorization of Force Resolution is harder. 
Beatty's failure to develop an institutional component to the 
idea of proportionality leaves us without an analytic framework 
to consider the importance of democratic support for and delib-
eration about executive power during wars or emergency.169 
Moreover, to the extent that Beatty is concerned with what 
courts actually do, we find widespread reliance on ultra vires 
analysis to constrain executive conduct, suggesting that histori-
cally, human rights are protected not only by direct rulings on 
the permissibility of constraints on individual liberties, but also 
by courts requiring executives to obtain (democratic) legislative 
support for their departures from customary liberties. 170 
167. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
168. See Brief of Comparative Law Scholars, supra note 164, at *9-*27 & app. A 
(surveying laws of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Spain, and United King-
dom). 
169. For a recent effort to consider how theories of interpretation might be im-
proved by more systematic efforts to analyze the institutional roles and capacities of the 
different institutions of governance, see Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 111. 
170. See, e.g., Public Cornm. Against Torture v. State of Israel, HCJ 5100/94 (Sup. 0· Isr. 1997) available at Supreme Court of Israel Website, http://elyonl.court.gov.il/ 
flles_~ng/94/000/051/a09/94051000.a09.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2005) (finding that the 
secunty forces could not engage in special interrogation practices involving torture in the 
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Consider the implications of a proportionality approach to 
the question of torture raised by recent revelations of prisoner 
abuse in Iraq and of legal memoranda (now withdrawn) appear-
ing to justify what many would regard as torture notwithstanding 
legal prohibitions. One can readily posit extreme cases in which 
some jurists, relying on a proportionality analysis focused on the 
interests of those most concerned, might permit torture to gain 
information that would save many lives, perhaps after a due 
process hearing to determine that the .,li'erson to be tortured was 
likely to have relevant information.1 Yet understanding this 
problem not within the context of a single case, but as a matter 
of longer-term consequences for other parties not before the 
court, might favor an absolute ban on torture, a formalist prohi-
bition, nominally immune to the demands of particularly com-
pelling facts. 172 A long-term analysis of the proportionalities, 
taking into account the ex ante effects of judicially articulated 
rules, might favor a categorical ban (arguably embodied in the 
Eighth Amendment) as the best way of minimizing the amount 
of torture that will occur.173 
Beatty's version of proportionality as a tool of constitutional 
analysis in individual rights cases, then, has a dark side. Precisely 
absence of very explicit authorization by Knesset). 
171. See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING 
THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 142--63 (2002) (arguing for judicial is-
suance of torture warrants); but cf. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL 
ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2004) (arguing for balance of liberty and security, with 
derogations from traditional civil liberties subject to judicial review); id. at 140 (support-
ing absolute ban on torture, notwithstanding need for information, because of its inflic-
tion of "irremediable harm on the torturer and the prisoner"); id. at 141 (challenge is to 
define distinction between permissible and impermissible duress, the latter to "include 
any physical coercion or abuse"). 
172. See Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and 
Civil Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1528 (2004). For exploration of the phenom-
ena, and moral difficulties, posed by "serious rules," see Larry Alexander & Emily Sher-
win, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1994). 
173. See Gross, supra note 172, at 1500-03; see also id. at 1506-07 ("The use of pre-
ventive interrogational torture under certain extreme circumstances is inevitable .... 
[A]cknowledging that inevitability, it still makes good sense to reject absolutely the use 
of torture."). Gross quotes Frederick Schauer: "Resisting the inevitable is not to be de-
sired because it will prevent the inevitable, but because it may be the best strategy for 
preventing what is less inevitable but more dangerous." ld., quoting Frederick Schauer, 
May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.1075, 1085 (1986). It might be 
objected that Gross's theory is inconsistent with norms of transparency in legal decisions, 
to the extent that it contemplates a seemingly absolute rule that is not expected abso-
lutely to constrain the prohibited conduct. I do not think this aspect of Gross's approach 
lacks transparency; rather, it lacks some degree of predictability in application in individ-
ual cases. The lack of predictability of the availability, ex post, of immunity from prose-
cution of punishment, however, is designed to have a strong deterrent effect on those 
holding the coercive power of the state. 
2004] BOOK REVIEWS 857 
because it corresponds to and helps structure intuitive notions of 
fairness and pragmatic reactions to factual situations, it is an ap-
proach that may offer less constraint on political branches at 
those times when they are most tempted to depart from custom-
ary protections of liberties-for at those times courts will be so 
tempted as well.174 Without some sense of institutional roles and 
of the longer term effects of judicial rulings, I am not sure it can 
serve-by itself-as the "ultimate" and exclusive rule of law 
Beatty envisions. 175 
v. 
Beatty's book bears the mark of one who has experienced 
"revelations," a word used in one of the chapter subheadings. 
Like many revelations, its light at once reveals an important 
landscape and casts shadows over other important topographical 
features. Although I have disagreed with Prof. Beatty on a num-
ber of claims, in the end I agree with him that questions of pro-
portionality are pervasive in analyzing whether a challenged law 
or action unduly infringes a liberty or fails to treat people or 
groups in a sufficiently consistent way. Where other tools of 
analysis leave open an interpretive question, analysis of the con-
sequences and proportionality of the action seems an entirely 
appropriate and commendable approach for judges to take-
always within the constrained limits of interpretive plausibility. 
But to claim omnicompetence for any one principle in con-
stitutional law will prevent that body of law from doing some of 
its most important work. Constitutions serve a number of pur-
poses, at once expressing the commitments of a particular na-
tional polity, a particular structure of government, protecting 
rights deemed important in that polity and protecting those basic 
human rights that undergird commitments to representative de-
mocracy and the rule of law. As many of the cases Beatty relies 
on demonstrate, national courts often rely both on concerns of 
174. See Vicki C. Jackson, Proconstitutional behavior, political actors, and independ· 
ent courts: A comment on Geoffrey Stone's paper, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 368, 369, 378-79 
(2004). For related reasons, Bruce. Ackerman would continue to prohibit torture even 
during emergency periods in which exceptions to other constitutional norms would be 
possible. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1071-
73 (2004). 
175. Consider here Beatty's analysis of religious liberty claims. See supra text ac-
companying notes 39-42. While in the short run the changes Beatty argues for would al-
low larger numbers of religiously minded persons to satisfy their religious preferences, in 
the longer run there is at least a question whether such practices would affect the condi-
tions for religious tolerance without which judicial doctrine is likely to be ineffective. 
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proportionality and their own constitutional texts and history; 
both on means-ends analyses and concerns for the special com-
petences of other branches. To the extent that constitutional law 
is, in part, an expression of national particularity/76 an interpre-
tive theory that does not allow for such particularities may lack 
the legitimacy to be workable. Judging constitutional claims un-
der national constitutions in practice may combine proportional-
ity analysis with institutional considerations, including deference 
to legislatures and concern for the effects of different rulings on 
the responses and capacities of other institutional actors, as well 
as with what Beatty regards as the more "interpretive" tools of 
analysis like text, intent, and precedent. To the extent that the 
inherited practices of constitutional adjudication by judges have 
involved consideration of constitutional values and texts and 
practices and precedents and consequences, to urge them to con-
sider only the individual proportionalities of each case could 
both delegitimize and destabilize the practice of judging. 
Beatty argues that both the challenged government's prac-
tices (such as exceptions to a challenged rule not available to the 
challenger) or less restrictive practices in other countries, pro-
vide objective bases on which to conclude that a governmental 
purposes can be served in a less burdensome way and is thus dis-
proportionate. In earlier work, Beatty has suggested that looking 
to comparative practices in other countries (such as statutes de-
signed to achieve similar goals in ways less restrictive of human 
liberty) can increase the "objectivity" of analysis, and argued 
that "it is principles of justification much more than questions of 
interpretation, that determine how well human rights are pro-
tected."171 A vision of constitutional courts protecting universal 
human rights supplies much of the normative foundation for his 
arguments. 178 This book's title claim to an "ultimate" rule of law 
176. On the role of constitutions and constitutional law in establishing authentic and 
distinct national identity, see, e.g., Richard Primus A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitari-
anism in Post-War Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423 (1996) (suggesting U.S. 
Court made conscious effort to differentiate the U.S. from European totalitarianism in 
mid-20th century); Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Nonauthorila-
tive Uses of Foreign Law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 269, 28~ (2003) (emphasizing impor-
tance of developing autochthonous constitutional law); H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Consti-
tutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political Paradox, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
WORLD 65-SO (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) (noting role of constitutions in pro-
claiming national sovereignty). 
177. BEATTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 3, at 115,105. 
178. Perhaps because of this commitment to proportionality as a method of protect-
ing universal human rights, in the 2004 book it is sometimes difficult to tell whether a 
national constitution itself matters to the proportionality review conducted in its name. 
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seems to resonate with Beatty's earlier concerns for protecting 
universal human rights and raises the possibility that he is not 
talking so much about constitutional law-in the sense of the 
fundamental and entrenched laws binding particular political 
communities-but rather, an emerging "human rights" law, ap-
plied regardless of constitutional text and national distinctive-
nesss, based on judges' trans-national and increasingly universal-
ized understandings of human rights, justice and proportionality, 
brought ever closer together by taking as a metric of necessity 
the most liberal (human freedom and substantive equality ad-
vancing) practices in other countries. 
Of course, one might argue, a world populated by govern-
ments fully committed to the protection of universal human 
rights would nonetheless offer ample latitude for a diversity of 
practices in distinctively self-governing communities. But to the 
extent constitutional review needs to remain an expression of 
national self-government while at the same time offering protec-
tion to basic human rights, it may need to adopt a more complex 
interpretive approach that retains anchors in the particular deci-
sions and institutions of its particular polity.179 So I end with a 
plea for a more proportional approach to the benefits of propor-
tionality analysis, as a necessary, but not sufficient, tool for the 
interpretive work of constitutional adjudication of still-national 
constitutions. 
For example, Beatty says: "[J]udges behave unconstitutionally if they validate laws they 
know cannot pass the test of fair shares and the principles of proportionality and equality 
by which it is applied." (p. 157). See also supra note 110 (quoting Beatty at pp. 156-57). 
"Fair shares" is the description Beatty gives to the principles he sees courts using in en-
forcing positive rights, a principle that he argues is related to proportionality. 
179. Even on such an understanding of constitutional law, thoughtful reflection on 
the decisions of other constitutional tribunals may be helpful. See Vicki C. Jackson, 
Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority and the U.S. Courts: Gender Equality, 37 
LoY. L.A. L. REV. 271,345-58 (2003). But so, too, is knowledge of the constitutional and 
judicial practices, peculiarities and traditions of one's own polity. 
